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Abstract 
The thesis explores the insights from behavioural economic research for 
tax compliance. The theoretical model of tax evasion by Allingham and 
Sandmo (1972) is reviewed and then enriched with findings from research 
on bounded rationality and unbounded motivation for human behaviour. 
In specific implications for tax compliance of loss aversion, 
overweighting of low probabilities, small sample bias and procrastination 
are discussed. It is suggested that the perception of probabilities and the 
tendency to procrastinate affect the decision on whether or not to comply 
taxes. Further, implications for tax compliance of moral motivation, 
conditional cooperation and the threat of intrinsic motivation being 
crowded out are discussed. The act of complying, even when the risk of 
getting caught is low, indicate that people do not behave entirely self-
interested.  
To explore the evasion decision further, and look in depth at some of 
the phenomena discussed, a survey-experiment is conducted. The objective 
is to study whether peoples’ tendency to overweigh low probabilities and 
their propensity to confirm to social norms affect their willingness to 
consider hiring black labour. The results from the experiment are reported 
at the end of the thesis. The main finding is that people overweigh low 
probabilities and that it affects their decision on considering hiring black 
labour. 
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1 Introduction 
 
One of the great transformations in modern western European history 
was the transition from the domain state, where government activities 
were funded from surpluses derived from the monarch, to the tax state, in 
which finances were based on taxes (Musgrave, 1992). As war drove the 
demand for revenues in the 16th and 17th century up, it created a context 
in which the wealthy in society felt threatened enough to allow the 
centralization of authority at the level of the state (Di John, 2006). After 
The British Civil War the principle of no taxation without representation 
or extraction of revenue without the consent of parliament was 
established. Not only did that introduce the principle of political 
accountability, but it also was the beginning of the current Western 
political system. Schumpeter (1918), referred to by Musgrave (1992), 
points out that the growing expenses of warfare created the financial 
difficulties that in the end were the causes for building the modern state. 
The transition into the tax state still has consequences for both the private 
economy and for the society in general.  
The public sector’s share of the economy is now growing in most 
OECD countries. Measured as a share of GDP for mainland Norway, 
public expenditure increased from 25 percent in 1960 to over 50 percent in 
2007. In the NOU Measures of Tax Evasion (2009) it is explicitly 
expressed that the work against tax evasion and the black economy is 
essential to maintain the balance of the welfare state. Higher income 
levels cause a higher demand for education, health and other public 
services that are currently funded through government budgets 
(Halvorsen, 2009). In this context it is becoming increasingly difficult to 
ignore the issue of tax evasion because the loss of tax revenue affects both 
the financing of the state and distorts the allocation of resources. Tax 
policies should thus be designed with the realities of evasion in mind 
(Slemrod, 2007). 
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The thesis is structured as follows. The first section explains the 
importance of the tax system and the challenge of tax evasion; the second 
section reviews the theoretical model of tax evasion by Allingham and 
Sandmo (1972) and discusses the main findings; the third section 
introduces the behavioural approach; the fourth section goes through 
implications for tax compliance of limited rationality; the fifth section 
looks at implications for tax compliance of moral motivation, the sixth 
section describes an experiment conducted to explore the evasion decision 
further and reports the results. The last section concludes. 
1.1 The optimal tax system 
The main issues concerning the optimality of the tax system are efficiency 
and fairness in the economy at large. An optimisation of the tax system is 
traditionally viewed as an attempt to minimize distortion and inequality 
in society (Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 1996). Sandmo (1975) defines the 
optimal tax system by three different parameters; administrative costs, 
fairness and efficiency.  
First, he points to the use of resources. An optimal tax system should 
minimize the resource costs involved in assessing, collecting and paying 
taxes. In the simplest way one could look at taxes as a transfer of income 
from people to the state, which in turn is redistributed by the state back to 
the people (Ramsey, 1927; Ballard and Fullerton, 1992). It is the 
enforcement of the tax law that transfers the tax from individuals to the 
government (Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 1996). The enforcement of tax laws, 
the costs of taxpayers in complying with those laws and the costs 
associated with tax collections (Di John, 2006) should also be done with 
the objective of efficacy. 
Secondly, the tax system must be evaluated in terms of justice and 
fairness (Sandmo, 1975). Taxes need to be predictable, transparent and 
administered by a fair judicial system (Di John, 2006). If the goal of tax 
policies is more equal distributions of utility, taxes should be set with the 
objective of distributing income from those with high utility to those with 
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low utility. In the Norwegian National Budget it explicitly stated that the 
tax policies are made with the objective of financing public spending and 
helping to bring about a just distribution of wealth. A dual income tax, 
first implemented in Norway in 1992, refers to a scheduler income tax in 
which capital income is taxed at a relatively low flat rate, while labour 
income is taxed at higher progressive rates (Kleinbard, 2010). Progressive 
tax rates increase the tax burden for those with high income and wealth 
relative to those with low income and wealth. This relates to the objective 
of vertical equity, which contributes to more equal distributions of wealth 
after taxes. People with unequal abilities to pay taxes are thus given 
unequal responsibilities for the tax burden. The tax system should also 
reflect a horizontal equity, which is ensuring that people with the same 
ability to pay taxes have to deal with the same share of the tax burden 
(Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980; Slemrod, 2007).  
 Third, the tax system should also minimize the aggregated 
deadweight loss for any given tax revenue or level of public expenditure so 
that the system is economically efficient (Sandmo, 1975).  Tax cuts and 
settlement subsidies in specific geographical regions are tools to obtain 
this goal. Industrial policy actions and tax benefits for specific industries 
are implemented with the objective of improving the functioning of the 
economy in general (National Budget, 2011). The Norwegian tax system 
brings in more than NOK 1200 billion per annum and these revenues are 
essential for the spending on public services like hospitals, education, 
public transportation and infrastructure (St. prp. 1 LS, 2012).   
1.2  The challenge of tax evasion 
Tax evasion refers specifically to efforts done by illegal means to avoid tax 
compliance. A variety of definitions of tax evasion have been suggested, 
but Alm (1999) narrows it down to ‘illegal and intentional actions taken by 
individuals to reduce legally due tax obligations’. One way to evade tax is 
by underreporting income or wealth. Another is to overstate deductions, 
exemptions or credits. Also, there is the possibility of people failing to file 
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the tax returns correctly and thereby evading taxes. The consequences of 
tax evasion are severe both for the state and for its citizens because it 
threatens the objective of optimality of the tax system. Tax evasion 
imposes administrative costs and disturbs both the efficiency of the tax 
system and the distribution of the tax burden.  
First, evasion leads to a misallocation of resource use because it 
imposes costs. It demands resources to implement and camouflage 
noncompliance and costs for the tax authorities to detect and handle it 
(Slemrod, 2007). Occasionally evasion is associated with activities at the 
side of the law because unreported income may finance, or come from, 
criminal activities (NOU, 2009). Dealing with such illegalities imposes 
additional costs on society. 
With reference to the objective of fairness, tax evasion leads to an 
unpredictable distribution of income. When equally well-off people relate 
to the tax system in unequal ways, they may end up with different tax 
burdens. Those who fail to pay taxes, intentionally or unintentionally, 
leave their burden with the compliant citizens. The paying group is thus 
forced to finance the portion of welfare benefits that really should have 
been paid by the evaders. This creates a horizontal inequity (Slemrod, 
2007). If parts of society manage to systematically evade taxes, then the 
effective tax system is less equitable than the legislated one. The pay off 
from evasion provides a socially inefficient incentive to engage in activities 
where tax evasion is relatively easy (Slemrod, 2007). People who relatively 
easy can evade taxes end up with a smaller share of their tax burden 
(Andreoni et al, 1998). A consequence is higher and more distortionary 
taxes on reported income, while unreported income escapes taxes and its 
distortionary effects (Andreoni et al, 1998). Because of these alterations, 
tax evasion may contribute to a feeling of unfairness and disrespect for the 
law. Other negative side effects of evasion are coming from difficulties in 
protecting employees in the hidden economy from illegal treatment and 
lack of social security (NOU, 2009), which may be argued to be potential 
unfair treatment of employees. 
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As for the third goal, tax evasion disturbs the efficiency of the tax 
system because the state experiences large revenue losses. Consequently 
the provision of public goods is affected in unfavourable ways (Alm, 1999). 
Further, societal changes like distorted competition may occur because of 
evasion if those who are underreporting income are able to offer relatively 
lower prices for their goods and services (Andreoni et al, 1998). 
1.3 Measuring evasion 
The tax gap is a term commonly used to describe the difference between 
the taxes that theoretically should have been paid if each and everyone 
fulfilled their tax obligations, and the taxes actually paid voluntarily on a 
timely basis (Andreoni et al., 1998; Skatteverket, 2008; NOU, 2009). One 
of the challenges when it comes to tax evasion is to make an empirical 
estimation of its size because it is difficult to measure a phenomenon that 
by its very nature is hidden. However, calculations undertaken in Sweden 
show a theoretically tax gap of about five percent of GDP (Skatteverket, 
2008). With a five percent evasion of total GDP, the tax gap in Norway is 
estimated to about NOK 136 billion (Økokrim, 2012). Given a tax gap at 
NOK 136 billion, taxed at 40 percent, the average yearly evasion is 
estimated to approximately NOK 54 billion. That corresponds to a daily 
evasion of about NOK 150 million. Compared with the all time largest 
robbery in Norway in 20041, when heavily armed men stole NOK 57,4 
million from the NOKAS cash depot, tax evasion constitutes more than 
two times this robbery every day. Evasion is a size that matters.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  To	  place	  these	  numbers	  in	  a	  context,	  Per	  Ivar	  Gjærum	  and	  Alexander	  Cappelen	  have	  provided	  this	  compelling	  comparison.	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2 Theoretical approach 
This chapter is structured as follows. Starting off with a clarification of 
key terms gives a lead in to the introduction of the model that the 
traditional analysis of tax evasion is build upon. That is in brief the 
general concept of economics of crime and the theory of rational behaviour 
under uncertainty. Next there is a review of the central issues in the 
theoretical model of tax evasion, as presented by Allingham and Sandmo 
(1972). Finally, the results of the model and its implications for further 
analysis of tax evasion are given. The objective of the theoretical review is 
to analyse the individual taxpayer’s decision on whether and to what 
extent to avoid taxes by deliberately underreporting income.  
The decision on whether to comply or evade taxes in this model is 
based on expected utility theory and theory of behaviour under 
uncertainty. The uncertainty lies in whether or not the tax authorities 
detect the underreported income. Only by a probability is the taxpayer 
audited. If detected for evasion, then there will be a penalty tax on the 
underreported fraction of income higher than the constant tax rate. The 
constant tax rate is known to the taxpayer and is paid based on the 
amount of income reported. The taxpayer has to choose between honesty, 
that is declare all actual income and dishonesty, that is declaring less 
than actual income. If the taxpayer chooses evasion, the gain from the 
gamble depends on whether or not there is an audit. If there is no audit, 
there is obviously a gain from evading. If there happens to be an audit, 
there are higher costs associated with evading than complying because of 
the penalty tax. Hence, the declared amount of actual income is the 
taxpayer’s decision variable. If an audit occurs it will inform the 
authorities about the taxpayer’s exact amount of actual income, then the 
taxpayer will have to pay tax on the undeclared amount of income at a 
penalty rate higher than the initial constant tax rate.  
The model of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) can easily be seen as 
an adaption of a simple model of portfolio choice with two assets, one safe 
and one risky. The reported fraction of actual income corresponds to 
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investments in the safe asset. The underreported amount corresponds to 
investments in the risky asset. Evasion is risky because if the taxpayer is 
caught cheating he will be penalized, if he is not he will experience a gain 
in form of avoiding taxes, but he does not know which of these two 
situations he will face. Compliance, on the other hand, is not associated 
with uncertain outcomes. Given the expected tax rate and the degree of 
uncertainty, the taxpayer is assumed to behave in a way that maximizes 
the expected utility of the gamble between the benefits of successful 
evasion and the risky prospect of detection. Evasion and probability of 
getting audited are unrelated in the same way as investing in a risky 
asset and getting a random return are.  
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) assume that the tax authorities do 
not use reported income as a basis for their procedures of detection, so 
that audits are assigned randomly at a constant rate. However, Alm 
(1999) points out that if the model included that the tax authorities used 
information on taxpayers’ income to choose which ones to audit it would be 
more realistic and audits would be more efficient. This is in line with 
Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein (1998) who argue that the chance of an 
audit should not be completely random because the probability of 
detection is expected to rely on the amount of income reported. However, 
in the present analysis I will stick to the original assumption of a 
constant, random audit rate, implying that the outcome of the evasion 
gamble is independent of how much income the taxpayer reports. 
2.1  The classical approach to tax evasion  
In the model of tax evasion by Allingham and Sandmo (1972), the 
taxpayer’s behaviour is assumed to follow the Von Neumann-Morgenstern 
axioms for behaviour under uncertainty so that preferences are 
represented by the expected utility function ! ! . Income is the only 
argument in the cardinal utility function and marginal utility is assumed 
to be everywhere positive and strictly decreasing, so that the individual is 
risk averse. Actual income ! is exogenously given and known only to the 
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taxpayer, whereas ! represents declared income and ! the probability of 
detection. If detected, the taxpayer will have to pay taxes on the 
undeclared fraction of income ! − ! at a penalty rate !, which is higher 
than the constant tax rate !. The taxpayer will choose declared income ! 
with the objective of maximizing expected utility: 
 
 ! ! = 1− ! ! ! − !" + !" ! − !" − ! ! − ! .   (1) 
 
The first term describes the situation in which detection is avoided, 
whereas the second term defines the situation in which the taxpayer is 
audited. Regardless of whether the taxpayer chooses a strategy of honesty 
or dishonesty, the expected utility function represents the two states the 
taxpayer may find himself in after making his decision. For notational 
convenience define 
 ! =! − !" as the taxpayer’s payoff without detection and  ! =! − !" − !(! − !) as the taxpayer’s payoff after detection.    (2) 
 
The expected utility equals one of these two extremes only if detection is 
avoided or the probability of detection is absolutely certain. For 
probabilities between 0 and 1, the expected utility remains somewhere in 
between these two extremes. Differentiate (1) with respect to declared 
income X to obtain the first-order condition for an interior maximum of 
the expected utility function. This can be written as 
 −!   1− !   !! ! − ! − !   !!! ! = 0      (3) 
or −!   1− !   !! ! = ! − !   !!! ! .     (4) 
 
The optimal solution is characterized by a situation where the expected 
marginal cost of evading more income is equal to the expected marginal 
benefit of evading more income. Whether or not 0 < X < W depends on the 
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values of the parameters. To see under what conditions an interior 
solution is possible, expected utility is evaluated at ! = 0 and ! =! . 
Since expected marginal utility is decreasing with !,  
 
 !" !!" !!! = −! 1− ! !! ! − ! − ! !"! ! 1− ! > 0  (5) 
and   
 !" !!" !!! = −! 1− ! !! ! 1− ! − ! − ! !!! ! 1− ! < 0.   (6)  
 
These conditions can then be rewritten as pπ > θ  (p+ 1− p !! !!! ! !!! ). 
The bracketed factor is positive and less than one and  pπ < θ,   which 
implies that the taxpayer will declare less than his actual income if the 
expected costs associated with the regular rate are higher than the 
penalty tax on unreported income. The two conditions provide a set of 
positive parameter values, which guarantee an interior solution X∗. The 
second-order condition is satisfied by the assumption of concavity of the 
utility function.   	  
2.2  Comparative statics  
The optimum conditions can be used to derive hypotheses about the 
taxpayers’ reactions to changes in the values of the exogenous parameters 
of the model. These are actual income, the tax rate, the probability of 
detection and the penalty rate. The changes are all thoroughly discussed 
in the original article. For this review it will be sufficient to go through the 
main findings, which are the effects of changes in the policy parameters 
penalty rate !  and probability of detection !  on the fraction of 
underreported income. There will also be a discussion of how changes in 
actual income ! affect the share of underreported income because it is 
relevant for the characterisation of evaders.  
 The extent of underreported income depends on the expected payoff 
of the evasion gamble and the taxpayer's risk preferences. If the expected 
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payoff of evasion is positive, then a risk-averse taxpayer will choose to 
underreport a fraction of actual income. For the comparative statics, use 
the Arrow-Pratt risk aversion measures of the curvature of the utility 
function. The absolute risk aversion function is defined as !! ! = − !!! !!! !    
and the relative risk aversion function as  !! ! = − !!! ! !!! ! . Absolute risk 
aversion expresses the actual amount of income the individual will choose 
to evade for a given level of wealth, while relative risk aversion defines the 
equivalent percentage of wealth invested. The general belief is that 
absolute risk aversion is decreasing with income. For relative risk 
aversion no definite hypothesis about its shape will be applied.2 
2.2.1 A change in the penalty rate 
First, to look at how reported income is affected by changes in the penalty 
rate !, we differentiate (3) with respect to ! to obtain  
 !"!" = − 1! ! − ! ! − ! !!!! ! − 1!   !!! ! .                (7) 
 
Both terms in this expression are positive because the second order 
condition D3 is negative due to the concavity of the utility function, 
implying that the first term is positive. The same reasoning goes for the 
second term.  This implies that the model predicts that an increase in the 
penalty rate unambiguously increases the fraction of declared income. The 
taxpayer's expected net income from evasion is reduced by stricter 
penalties therefore the income effect from the increase is negative. The 
substitution effect is also affecting evasion negatively because increased 
penalties makes evasion less profitable at the margin. The result from the 
model implies that more severe penalties will decrease tax evasion.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  See	  Allingham	  and	  Sandmo	  for	  details.	  3	  ! = !! 1 − ! !!! + (! − !)!!!!(!).	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2.2.2 A change in the probability of detection 
Secondly, the way a change in the probability of detection ! will affect the 
fraction of reported income provides information on whether the likelihood 
of audits influences the taxpayer’s decision. Differentiate (3) with respect 
to ! to obtain 
 
 !"!" = !! −!!! ! + ! − ! !! !   .                                                                                                                      (8)   
The first term inside the brackets is negative because !! ! > 0. The 
second term is also negative because ! < !. As we know that ! ≤ !,  the 
whole expression in brackets has to be negative. The second-order 
condition D is negative due to the concavity of the utility function, and 
therefore this derivative is positive. The model predicts that an increase in 
the probability of detection ! also will increase the fraction of declared 
income. The taxpayer will prefer to evade less because the expected utility 
of evasion has been reduced. Since the taxpayer is assumed to be risk-
averse, higher probabilities of being investigated will encourage 
compliance.  
2.2.3 A change in actual income  
The attempt to characterize the evaders is done by looking at how changes 
in the taxpayer’s actual income affect the share of declared income. 
Differentiate (3) with respect to actual income ! to obtain 
 
 !"!" = !! (! 1− ! !!! ! + ! − ! 1− ! !!!! ! ) (9) 
 
Substitute from (3) and rewrite this as 
 
 !"!" =   − !! ! 1− ! !! ! (− !!! !!! ! + 1− !   !!! !!!(!) ). 
 
As  
! !!!" = !!!   !"!"! − ! , it is possible to substitute from (9) and the 
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second-order condition4 to obtain  ! !!!" = !!!   !! ! 1− ! !!! ! ! + ! − ! !!!! ! ! − !! 1− ! !!! ! ! −! − ! !!!!! ! !  . 
 
Collect terms and substitute from (2) to see that  
 
 
! !!!" = !!!   !!   (0 1− ! !!! ! ! + ! − ! ! !!! ! !   .  (10) 
 
Substitute in this expression from the first-order condition (3) to obtain  
 
 
! !!!" = !!!   !!  ! 1− ! !′(!)(  !! ! − !!(!)).   (11) 
 
When actual income changes, the fraction of declared income increases, 
stays constant or decreases according to whether relative risk aversion is 
an increasing, constant or decreasing function of income. There is thus no 
clear-cut hypothesis on how the share of reported income varies with 
actual income.  
2.3  Main insights 
The main insights from the model are that an increase in the probability 
of detection ! and the penalty rate ! unambiguously increase the fraction 
of declared income. The two policy tools can work as substitutes for each 
other (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972). If the penalty rate is decreased, 
then evasion increases and expected tax revenue falls. However, this loss 
can be balanced by an increase in the probability of detection through 
more frequent audits. An increase in actual income ! has an ambiguous 
effect on the fraction of declared income, which depends on the 
individual’s attitude toward risk.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  The second order condition equals ! = !!(1 − !)!!! ! + (! − !)!!!!! ! . (Allingham and 
Sandmo, 1972)	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2.4  A challenge 
When comparing the model of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) to real life 
observations, we meet a challenge. The suggestion that the taxpayer 
underreports income if expected return per dollar evaded is strictly 
positive should imply a relatively high level of evasion because the tax 
systems in most countries typically indicate a positive return on evasion 
from 0.99 to 0.75 on every evaded dollar (Bernasconi, 1997). Nevertheless, 
estimates show that between 30% and 60% of taxpayers report, or attempt 
to report, their incomes correctly (Bernasconi, 1997) so the observed level 
of evasion rarely reaches the level predicted by the standard model (Alm, 
McClelland and Schulze, 1992; Alm, 1999). The results from the AS-model 
imply that rational individuals should underreport income or overstate 
deductions because chances are that they most likely will go unpunished 
(Alm, 1999). Yet, given the fiscal parameters in most countries, 
individuals have to show an aversion toward risk that far exceeds the 
conventional hypotheses for the model to be fully explanatory. (Torgler, 
2002; Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein, 1998)   
 In the theoretical model of tax evasion, the individual choice 
between evasion and compliance is based upon a rational calculation 
between the costs and benefits of the gamble. The assumptions made are a 
simple, formalized and practical for analytical purposes, but when 
applying them to real life behaviour, they become too simple because the 
model is unable to explain what we actually see. Unambiguous results 
from changes in the policy parameters can only be derived in such simple 
models. When more complex dimensions of behaviour are introduced, the 
theoretical results generally become indefinite (Alm, 1999). It is clear that 
the probabilities of detection and penalties have effects on the fraction of 
reported income, but they are not necessarily fully explanatory for the 
actual level of tax compliance (Alm, McClelland, and Schulze, 1992). If the 
model were fully applicable to real life behaviour, then people are expected 
to pay taxes only because they fear detection and punishment. Yet, as an 
example, when taxpayers are asked about there reasons for complying 
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with the laws their answer is seldom fear. The most frequent answers on 
why people comply are actually ethical and moral concerns (NOU, 2009). 
This indicates that there is a moral motivation for tax compliance, but this 
is not taken into account in the classical model of evasion.  To completely 
explain the behaviour of taxpayers, Alm (1998) suggests that one should 
recognize theories from outside the classic expected utility theory to add 
realism to the analysis of tax evasion.  
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3 Behavioural approach 
Economic models typically apply some simplifying traits to human 
behaviour. In short, they assume that people have unbounded rationality, 
unbounded willpower, unbounded selfishness and well-defined preferences 
(Thaler and Mullainathan, 2008). Allingham and Sandmo (1972) also 
assume that the taxpayer’s behaviour confirms to the Von Neumann-
Morgenstern axioms for behaviour under uncertainty. These axioms 
impose specific constraints on the possible relationships between people’s 
preferences (McDermott, 2001) and assume that preferences are 
consistent5. Reasoning based on these axioms implies that there are no 
differences between normative and descriptive characteristics: People 
behave in the way that maximizes their subjective expected utility and 
they all conform to the same normative axioms in this pursuit. So the 
theory of expected utility works well as a normative description of people’s 
preferences in these situations, but as a descriptive theory of how they 
actually behave it has been criticised (Levin, 2006). The assumptions are 
primarily made for the control of the economic models, but they are not 
intended as accurate descriptions of behaviour in the real world (Congdom 
et al, 2009). 
Combining insights from economics with insights from psychology 
on preference formation and choice makes it is possible to investigate 
what happens when human limitations and complications are integrated 
in traditional economic models of behaviour (Thaler and Mullainathan, 
2001). By using behavioural economics researchers have identified several 
factors that most likely are closely related to taxpayers’ behaviour, yet 
they are not given much attention in the model of Allingham and Sandmo 
(1972). The main findings are that people do not always act completely 
rational, they are not perfectly self-interested and their preferences are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Transitivity is the assumption that if alternative 1 is preferred to alternative 2, and 2 is 
preferred to 3, then 1 is preferred to 3 as well. Dominance is the assumption that if one 
option has at least one better feature, and is at least as good on all other aspects, it will 
be preferred to the others. Invariance is the assumption that a preference remains 
unchanged regardless of order or method or presentation (McDermott, 2001).	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not always consistent (Alm and Jacobsen, 2007; Torgler, 2002; Kahneman, 
2011). There is thus much evidence that people systematically behave 
differently than what the standard models predict.  
The individual decision on whether to evade or comply taxes is 
potentially closely related to issues of limited rationality and internal 
motivation for economic choice. OECD (2010) points out that additional 
knowledge on the supplementary drivers of compliance are relevant for 
taxation strategies and interventions as well as the effectiveness of 
communication and enforcement of tax policies. As tax evasion includes 
problem solving, complex calculations and potentially also moral concerns, 
behavioural factors are essential elements of any complete theory 
(Congdon et al., 2009). The insights from behavioural economics do not 
only change the understanding of individual compliance behaviour, but 
also the understanding of the welfare consequences of taxation, the 
relative desirability of using the tax system as a platform for policy 
implementation, and the role of taxes as an element of policy design 
(Congdon et al., 2009).  
As tax evasion by its very nature is a concealed activity, field data 
on the subject is limited both in quantity and quality. However, the 
experimental method has proven to be useful for the understanding of 
taxpayers’ behaviour (Behavioural Insights Team, 2012; Torgler, 2002) 
because experiments provide a controlled environment in which 
predictions can be tested. There is also a possibility to examine both the 
mechanisms of interest and changes in the environments, in isolation from 
each other (Alm and Jacobsen, 2007). The implications of behavioural 
economics for tax evasion have yet to be systematically explored.  
Potentially they can explain some of the discrepancy between the observed 
level of evasion and the predictions from standard economic theory.  
To shed new light over the decisions made in the evasion gamble, 
there follows a discussion of behavioural insights for tax compliance. First, 
there will be an introduction to the trait of limited rationality. In this 
section the implications of loss aversion, overweighting of low 
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probabilities, small sample bias and procrastination for tax compliance are 
discussed. Secondly, there will be an introduction to the trait of moral 
motivation. In this section the implications of moral motivation, 
conditional cooperation and crowding out intrinsic motivation are 
discussed6.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  There are of course numerous behavioural phenomena that potentially are closely 
related to taxpayers’ behaviour. The selection in this thesis is based on relevance, 
interest and existing research.	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4 Rationality 
One of the main insights from behavioural research is that individuals are 
imperfectly rational. This captures the general finding that individuals 
are relatively bad at choosing optimally because they find it hard to know 
what is optimal and they fail to do what is optimal (Congdon et al., 2009). 
Because people are bounded by both limited cognitive capacity and time, 
their abilities to solve problems and do complex calculations are 
constrained. A way to work around these limitations is to adapt rules of 
thumb that economize on the individual capacity (Thaler and 
Mullainathan, 2008). Unbounded rationality is therefore not a fully 
convincing description of how the human way of reasoning. Furthermore, 
people do not always consider their long-term interests when making 
choices. Even in situations where they know what is best for them, they 
often choose to do the opposite. It is thus inaccurate to treat willpower as 
an infinite human resource.  
In the following there is first a summary of theoretical basics, and 
then implications of the theory for tax compliance are discussed. The first 
part focuses on loss aversion, the second part on overweighting of low 
probabilities and small sample bias, while the third part is devoted to the 
trait of procrastination. 
4.1 Loss aversion 
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) assume taxpayers’ preferences to be 
independent of their current assets. They also analyse the evasion gamble 
based on the assumption that the presentation or order of choices are 
irrelevant to the decision. However, there is much evidence showing that 
people systematically violate these assumptions in actual behaviour and 
act inconsistent with the basic principles of the expected utility theory 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). The expected utility theory as a model of 
behaviour under uncertainty is supplemented by introducing prospect 
theory, where a value function of choice replaces probabilities with 
decision weights as described in Figure 1. The reference-dependent theory 
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of consumer choice deriving from this model explains how the reference 
level may affect individual choice and this is the basis for understanding 
the trait of loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1991). 
 
Figure 1: The Value Function 
 
Note: The figure shows the psychological value of gains and losses to the right 
and left of a neutral reference point. In prospect theory, probabilities are 
replaced with decision weights and people’s reactions to changes in income are 
experienced relative to a neutral reference point. (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). 
 
There are three distinct features to the value function. First, values 
are addressed to outcomes relative to a reference point rather than to final 
states of wealth or welfare. This is the characteristic of reference 
dependence and it captures the finding that people evaluate what they 
acquire or give up relative to their initial entitlements or what is 
commonly described as their status quo (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).  
Secondly, the shape of an S demonstrates diminishing sensitivity to 
both gains and losses. The curve is concave above the reference point and 
convex below it, showing that the reactions to both gains and losses 
decrease with their size and that people are risk averse when they 
consider losses yet risk seeking when they consider corresponding gains 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). 
Third, the function is steeper for losses than for gains and the 
utility function is kinked at the reference point. This indicates that 
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reactions to losses are stronger than reactions to corresponding gains. 
This is the trait of loss aversion. It refers to the general finding that losses 
and disadvantages have a greater impact on preferences than gains and 
advantages. In practice this means that a change has a stronger effect 
when it is regarded as a loss than when that same change is experienced 
as a gain (Kahneman and Tversky, 1991). Contrary to what the expected 
utility theory predicts based on consistent preferences, the experienced 
difference between a loss and a gain may lead people to change their 
preferences, even though their final state of wealth remains unchanged 
(Kahneman, Tversky, 1991). 
Loss aversion can explain why mutually acceptable trades in 
experiments often are very low. The measures of willingness to accept a 
trade for a good strongly exceed the measures of willingness to pay for the 
same good. (Thaler, 1980) This inconsistency reflects a reference 
dependence of preferences. Giving up a valued good has a stronger effect 
on people than the utility gain associated with receiving the same good 
because their reference point changes from nothing to something, 
therefore people want a higher compensation for giving up a good they 
own, than what they are willing to pay in order to get it if they do not own 
it. It shows that the evaluation of a good’s value increases when the good 
becomes part of the individual’s endowments. Kahneman, Knetsch, and 
Thaler (1990) tested this endowment effect (Thaler, 1980) in a series of 
experiments where participants were randomly given consumption objects 
of low value, e.g. a coffee mug, and then the number of accepted trades 
was measured. According to standard economic theory about half of the 
mugs should be subjects of trade after bargaining, because the allocation 
of resources should be independent of the assignment of property rights 
when costless transactions are possible.7 Initial entitlements and property 
rights should not affect final allocations, but the results show the opposite. 
The experiments show that the transaction rate is affected by whether 
goods are being acquired or given up, even when there are no transaction 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  This	  prediction	  is	  based	  on	  the	  Coase	  theorem.	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costs or income effects associated with the trade (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1991). The average demanded selling price was twice as high as the price 
buyers were willing to pay. Kahneman and Tversky (1991) explain this 
result with the value function and suggest that the reference level affects 
the participants’ preferences. This result can also be related to the trait of 
status quo bias, which makes people reluctant to changes in their status 
quo or default settings. Even though there are minimal costs associated 
with such a change, people are highly averse towards it because giving up 
the status quo feels like a loss (Alm, 2012).  
4.1.1 Implications for tax compliance 
Now, consider the implications of loss aversion for tax compliance 
behaviour. Allingham and Sandmo (1972) regard the difference between 
being audited and avoiding auditing as two different states of wealth, 
where the utilities of these two states of wealth are the only concerns that 
matter to the taxpayer’s decision. Tax evasion is not supposed to be 
affected by preliminary tax payments, as it is the final net of tax income 
that matters. Yet, as Yaniv (1999) points out, those who have paid too 
much tax in advance experience their refund taxes as a gain and this 
feeling may affect compliance. In fact, this has been shown to be the case 
in a Swedish study where taxpayers who paid too little in preliminary 
taxes were less likely to comply than those who paid too much (Engström 
et al, 2011). Further, they were more likely to claim deductions than those 
who had a preliminary surplus. The result is based on data from 3,6 
million Swedish taxpayers for the income year 2006 and correspond to 
evidence from other experimental findings (Engström et al., 2011; 
Schepanski and Shearer, 1995). Engström et al. (2011) find a significant 
change at zero preliminary deficits and quote the study of Dhami and al 
Nowaihi (2007) where it is found that evasion also increases with the 
degree of loss aversion. By using actual tax return data, Chang and 
Schultz (1990) find that compliance also depends on over- and under-
withholding at the time of filing. Even though the taxpayers’ final states of 
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wealth remain the same, their preferences change. The suggested 
explanation for these deviations from the standard theory is loss aversion: 
Those who have a tax deficit when filing their returns comply less than 
those who have refunds due because they experience it as a loss in 
arrears, but as a forgone gain in advance.   
In 1995 a field experiment on tax evasion was carried out in 
Minnesota. (Slemrod et al., 1998) 1724 taxpayers got a message from the 
tax authorities that their tax returns would be subject to thoroughly 
audits that year and if there was found any irregularities, the tax 
authorities would go further into investigating earlier years’ tax returns 
as well. The experiment led to a clear reduction in level of evasion for 
almost all groups (NOU, 2009). This relates to the effort people are willing 
to make if they are facing a potential loss relative to the effort they are 
willing to make if they are considering gains. Their reactions to losses 
seem to be stronger and the share of tax returns requiring correction 
actually increases with balance due (Cox and Plumley, 1988). People are 
apparently willing to make a stronger effort to make their returns flawless 
if they owe taxes than if they have refunds due. 
A possible explanation for this may be that individuals with a 
preliminary tax deficit perceive a higher marginal value of extra income 
than an individual with a preliminary tax surplus of the same amount 
because their reference points are different. Taxpayers with taxes due 
may then be less willing to comply because the valuation of losses 
compared to the reference point would be higher than gains of the same 
amount. If the taxpayer pays too much in preliminary tax and correctly 
reports actual income to the tax authorities, it will result in a refund. With 
reference to the value function, this is experienced as a gain. However, if 
taxes paid in advance are lower than actual tax liabilities, then the 
taxpayer owe taxes, and faces a forthcoming loss. As the utility function in 
prospect theory is convex for losses, this taxpayer might be more willing to 
consider the risky option of tax evasion (Dhami and al-Nowaihi, 2007). 
Bernasconi and Zanardi (2004) consider the people that owe taxes as being 
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in the loss domain. They suggest that these taxpayers will be expected to 
evade taxes until they enter the gain domain, given that they are not 
audited. Therefore advance tax payments or standard deductions may 
increase compliance because more people would be facing gains after 
preliminary taxes were paid (Dhami and al-Nowaihi, 2007). 
Correspondingly, less people would be placed in the loss domain where the 
risky decision of evasion is expected to be more tempting. Yet, if higher 
preliminary taxes make people feel that they are treated unfairly it is not 
certain that such initiatives would have an unambiguously positive effect. 
Reference dependence may also affect how income differences 
influence the evasion decision. In a reference dependent model of choice 
under risk, Rablen (2010) replaces the enforcement regime with a 
relationship of exchange in which taxpayers care about the exchange 
equity between the value of taxes paid and the value of provided public 
goods. The perceived exchange equity is used as the taxpayers’ reference 
level and it is found that evasion is affected by a measure of both relative 
income and earlier state of wealth (Rablen, 2010). If the tax rate increases 
and people perceive public goods to be undersupplied, evasion increases. 
However, if people perceive public goods to be oversupplied, evasion 
decreases with increases in the tax rates.   
The policy implications deriving from these findings could be that a 
somewhat higher preliminary tax level would influence tax evasion and 
lead to higher compliance than correct preliminary taxes do because of 
loss aversion (Engström et al., 2011). If less people experienced a loss 
when filing their tax returns, higher compliance could be accomplished, 
but there is also a risk that a higher preliminary tax level based on ‘false’ 
premises could decrease the general trust in the tax system (Dhami and 
al-Nowaihi, 2007). 
4.2 Overweighting of low probabilities and small sample bias 
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) assume that the taxpayer’s decision on 
evasion is based on the expected utility of a gamble where the risk of 
getting audited plays a fundamental part. Based on the probability of 
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detection and the corresponding penalty, the taxpayer is expected to make 
a rational choice between evasion and compliance. How will it affect the 
outcome of this gamble, if the taxpayer is unable to grasp the information 
that a given probability provides? Even though the probability of an event 
is low, people often act as if it was higher (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). 
This phenomenon is quite common and it is often seen when people are 
asked to evaluate the probability of e.g. a plain crash or a natural disaster. 
They think that they are more likely to occur than what they actually are. 
The similarities between such events and the taxpayer’s decision are that 
they involve some degree of uncertainty and are characterized by low 
probabilities, yet relatively high losses (Alm, 1992). From prospect theory 
we have that people are not always completely rational in their evaluation 
of probabilities and when it comes to low probabilities people often 
overweigh them (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).  Figure 2 shows the 
weighting function for gains as a function of the probability of a given 
event. 
 
Figure 2: Weighting function for gains 
 
Note: The figure shows that when probabilities are low people overweigh them 
and behave as if they were higher. They are not able to distinguish between 
differences in very low probabilities. Further, the figure shows that the impact 
from high probabilities generally is underweighted. The diagonal in the figure 
represents the rational evaluation of probabilities. The curve is steeper closer to 
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the extremes because people generally are more affected by changes from a state 
of certainty to a state of uncertainty than to changes inbetween uncertainties.   
 
According to the prospect theory, there are two extremes related to 
probabilities: Impossibility and certainty. The impact from probabilities in 
between in between these extremes is described in a weighting function 
where low probabilities are overweighed and moderate to high 
probabilities are underweighted. The implication from diminishing 
sensitivity is an inverse S-shaped weighting function that is concave near 
impossibility and convex near certainty. The overweighting of low 
probabilities leads to risk seeking for gains and risk aversion for losses 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979. Further the function is steeper as it moves 
closer to the extremes, which explains why a minor adjustment in a 
probability of an event has a major impact when it changes the state of an 
event from impossible to possible or from possible to certain (Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1979). This is in opposition to changes in probabilities in 
between these extremes where the impact is weaker. The effect from a 
change in probabilities from zero to 0,02 is thus greater than a change 
from 0,02 to 0,04. On the contrary, for a rational individual, the weighting 
function would be expected to be the diagonal in the figure, implying that 
a change of 0,02 in probabilities would have the same impact regardless of 
the initial probability of the event.  
 In addition to the aversion to losses, people also seem to be 
ambiguity averse. If they find themselves in a situation of genuine 
uncertainty, that is when probabilities are not objectively known, it 
disturb their decision more than when they know the probabilities of the 
events. This phenomenon is shown by an experiment in which people 
preferred to bet on an urn containing an equal number of red and black 
balls, rather than on one in which there were an unknown proportion of 
each colour (Bernasconi, 1997). 
We now turn from the discussion of how much probabilities affect 
people to a description of how people estimate what they think is the 
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probability of a given event. The small sample bias is not shown by the 
weighting function, but it is a bias that leads people to think that they 
know the probability that an event will occur, even though they have very 
limited information. People systematically behave according to what 
Kahneman and Tversky (1981) refer to as the law of small numbers. Buy 
doing this they overestimate the probability that a small sample has the 
same distribution as the one it is drawn from - even though this is rarely 
the case. Rabin (2000) shows that a person exaggerates the probability of 
a short sequence of signals to resemble the long-run rate of the same 
signals. This is in line with the common misperception known as the 
gambler’s fallacy. People think early draws of one type of signal increases 
the odds of drawing the opposite signal in the next round. This is based on 
the belief that the second draw is negatively correlated with the first 
draw. When the rate of the signals is not objectively known, people just 
take their knowledge from a short sequence of signals and therefore 
believe that the rate is more extreme than it is.  
4.2.1 Implications for tax compliance  
The penalty on fraudulent evasion rarely exceeds the amount of unpaid 
taxes, and these penalties are seldom imposed. The percentage of 
individual income tax returns subject to in-depth tax investigation is less 
than one percent in almost all countries (Alm, 2011). The corresponding 
penalty on evasion in e.g. the US is only 75 percent of the unpaid taxes 
(Alm et al, 1991). A standard economic analysis of the evasion gamble 
then predicts most rational individuals to evade because it is highly 
improbable that they will be audited. It thus seem clear that most rational 
individuals facing the evasion gamble should underreport income not 
subject to source withholding or over-claim deductions not subject to 
independent verification because of the extremely low probabilities of 
audits and penalties. However, this prediction does not correspond to the 
observed level of evasion, which is much lower. Even in the least 
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compliant countries it is very rare that the level of evasion predicted by a 
purely economic analysis is reached (Alm, 2011).  
Alm et al (1991) carried out an experiment where the participants 
were faced with a classic tax compliance decision. According to the 
standard model of evasion, the single-period dominant strategy for a risk-
neutral individual is to underreport all income whenever the probability of 
detection is less than five percent (Alm, 1991). However, in an experiment 
carried out by Alm (1991) there was a substantial level of compliance 
(50,3%) even when the probability of detection is as low as two percent. 
Alm et al (1991) point out that the explanation for this may be 
overweighting of low probabilities (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), but it 
should be noted that people might also be influenced by their extreme 
aversion toward risk at low probabilities (Machina, 1983).  
Bernasconi (1997) discusses the suggestion that the compliant 
individuals overweigh the low probability of detection. There is an 
important difference between the actual probability of an audit and the 
taxpayer’s estimation of that probability. If people behave consistent with 
a threat that is higher than the one they are exposed to it might explain 
some of the excess compliance observed. When taxpayers faced a situation 
where there is no objective knowledge of the actual audit probability, they 
may be even more reluctant to evade taxes because of ambiguity aversion 
because risk taking in such situations is experienced as much worse than 
in situations where probabilities are known.  
When the following question was posed to people working in a 
diversity of businesses; “If a business in your industry fails to report all 
taxes how much chance do you think it is that the tax authorities will 
detect this?”, 62% of the respondents answered very large or large8 (NOU, 
2009; Krisino, 2011) The survey also reports that people find internal 
controls and institutional barriers to be more threatening than the 
controls from the tax authorities (Krisino, 2011). The institutional 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  The	  numbers	  are	  from	  ’NOU:	  Measures	  Against	  Tax	  Evasion’	  (2009).	  In	  2007	  27%	  answered	  very	  small	  or	  small	  and	  62%	  answered	  very	  large	  or	  large	  on	  the	  same	  question.	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obstacles are likely related to the use of third party information, which 
proved to be an important factor against evasion in the study of Kleven et 
al. (2010). The risk of getting detected can therefore be stressed by 
emphasising on the high degree of third party information available for 
the tax authorities (Cabinet Office Behavioural Insights Team, 2012). The 
responses people give in the Norwegian tax survey indicate that a high 
subjective perception of the probability of detection reduces evasion (NOU, 
2009). To increase compliance in groups that are able, but not willing, to 
comply, it is therefore suggested that control measures that raise the 
perceived risk of detection may be beneficial for compliance. The objective 
is to make the risk of detection to appear high, and make the sanctions as 
deterrent as possible (NOU, 2009).  
 In the further we will look at the implications for tax compliance of 
the small sample bias. If people believe in the law of small numbers, they 
use small samples as their benchmark for the overall audit rates. This 
might lead them to exaggerate the extent to which the tax authorities are 
able to detect people. According to Krisino (2011) those who have been 
inspected the last three to five years, experience an average perceived risk 
of detection between five and nine percentage points higher than those 
who have not. This provides support for notion that controls from 
authorities raise the subjective probability of getting caught after being 
checked. The suggestion is that they simplify the estimation of audit rates 
by thinking that it is more frequent, because they have been investigated. 
However, this experienced frequency may not be representable for the 
overall, actual audit rates. This can be a favourable bias to the tax 
authorities because it may be used to their advantage. By focusing audits 
on small fractions of the population in a diversity of geographical and 
professional areas, the small sample bias may lead people to think that 
the chances of getting caught are higher than they really are. If the 
resources the tax authorities possess are limited it may be beneficial to 
focus on a relatively small, randomly chosen proportion of the population 
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to be carefully investigated, rather than trying to give the unrealistic 
impression that all taxpayers are in the loop.  
4.3 Procrastination 
Standard economic theory assumes that people have unbounded self-
control. Consequently they follow their plans no matter what happens. 
When decisions are made based on expected utility they are unbiased, the 
discounting rate is the same no matter when a transaction takes place and 
it does not depend upon time.  
Contrary to the standard economic assumptions, it is observed from 
actual behaviour that people have problems with behaving consistently 
because of limited self-control. To start exercise, to quit smoking, to pay 
debt, it is more tempting to postpone it until tomorrow, rather than just do 
it today. Regardless of whether people prefer a strategy of compliance or 
evasion, there is an implicit assumption in the model of Allingham and 
Sandmo (1972) that people manage to make a rational decision and 
implement the strategy they choose. The tendency to procrastinate is an 
example of people’s lack of self-control and captures the general finding 
that people often overrate their own abilities to follow their plans and 
exaggerate their capacity to shape the future (Kahneman, 2011).  
The basic idea is that people assign special importance to today, 
beyond the general trait of being impatient and valuing the near future 
more than the far future. A plan reflects a rational evaluation of 
advantages and disadvantages, gains and losses, over time, but when 
facing the moment of acting according to the plan, the trait of self-control 
is seldom as unbounded as economic models assume it to be. The moment 
today is valued higher than any other day; consequently people 
procrastinate and postpone their plans although nothing unforeseen has 
happened. This type of behaviour is clearly seen in the consumption of 
unhealthy commodities, where future costs are large relative to present 
benefits. Never the less, people tend to behave according to present desire, 
rather than to the future consequences. 
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Take the preference change when people plan their savings. People 
may have a strategy for high savings next year, but when the next year 
actually is there they are tempted to postpone their plan for another year. 
Many people rather act according to the new preference, than to their 
original plan. This sort of behaviour is confirmed in a study on retirement 
saving policies. Chetty et al. (2013) study the differences in savings when 
people have to choose between tax subsidies and automatic saving policies. 
The first alternative changes behaviour through active choice because 
people have to choose to increase their savings deliberately. The latter 
change behaviour through passive choice because if they do not actively 
choose to avoid it, their default choice is increased savings. They find that 
the automatic saving plans or default policies are far more effective at 
increasing savings than when people have to make an active choice. One 
of the most widely used techniques to compensate for tendency to 
procrastinate is commitment and creation of binding constraints. 
Compulsory saving like Social Security or automatic pension plans have 
helped people to put away the amount of money they originally decided to 
save, and take away the opportunity alternate from the plan. Default 
investment options and deadlines on financial decisions are beneficial for 
procrastinators and they have few negative side effects for people who 
actually manage to stick to their plan (McCaffery and Slemrod, 2004).  
The negative effect of time-inconsistent behaviour is relatively 
dependent on whether people are aware of the ways that they are 
influenced by time. If a person realizes that future preferences will change 
compared to the present, it is possible to implement strategies of self-
commitment that limit future possibilities and make it impossible to 
deviate from the original plan. People are actually willing to pay a price to 
pre-commit to future actions and thereby avoid temptation (Laibson, 
1997). To avoid procrastination there has to be excessively economical or 
social costs associated with an alteration of the original plan. In the epic 
Odyssey, Ulysses sails pass the island of the bewitched Sirens who are 
known for their alluring songs that lead ships to sink and sailors to die 
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(Elster, 2000). Ulysses avoids this destiny because he forces his men to tie 
him to the ship’s mast before they reach the island. Similarly, strong ropes 
are needed to tie decision makers with bounded willpower and self-control 
to their plans (Kahneman, 2011). 
4.3.1 Implications for tax compliance 
It is suggested that the overall high level of compliance is explained by the 
fact that most people are unable to evade because of third party reporting. 
Procrastination may potentially explain the the opposite pattern seen 
among self-employed: Self-reported income represents only around five 
percent of total income reported to the tax authorities, but it is responsible 
for 87% of detected tax evasion in Denmark and the same tendency is 
observed in other countries (Kleven et al., 2010). It may be that it is not 
necessarily by ill will that self-employed tend to evade more than other 
taxpayers, but that failed planning puts a spanner in their works. If self-
employed postpone to put money aside for taxes, as a result they have less 
money available for taxes at the end of the year and that might make 
them consider evasion as a possible way out. Note that this has not been 
thoroughly investigated, but it is possible to apply the reasoning from 
automatic savings plans to automatic tax returns to see the similarity 
(McCaffery and Slemrod, 2004).  
As people actually are willing to pay a price for pre-commitment 
just to avoid temptation (Laibson, 1997), it might be that the suggestion 
from Engström et al. (2011) of slightly higher preliminary taxes could 
work as such a temporary price for commitment. In addition, automatic 
tax returns hinder people from making mistakes and third party reporting 
takes the responsibility for the individual tax return away from the 
taxpayer  (Laibson, 1997). The policy implications deriving from these 
findings points to the importance of pre-filled tax returns. Pre-filled tax 
returns are based on previous years filing and all available third party 
information. They reduce the error rates in tax submissions, provide 
assistance and streamline processes. Overall the system has improved 
effectiveness substantially (OECD, 2008). For both taxpayers and the 
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authorities, pre-filled tax returns remove a considerable amount of work 
and make complying with the law a lot easier. In Denmark 72% of the 
personal taxpayers received a pre-filled return that fully and accurately 
reflected their tax liability for the fiscal year 2006 (OECD, 2008), but self-
employed are not in this group. A study of tax administrations in 13 
countries found that the most effective systems share a tendency to 
prepopulate all the fields in the tax forms to increase the accuracy of the 
taxpayer’s initial tax returns (Dohrmann and Pinshaw, 2009). A more 
effective use of third party information and pre-filled returns may 
therefore decrease the burden of administrating the tax laws and 
complying within them.  
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5 Moral motivation 
Traditional economic theory stresses self-interest as the only motivation 
for human behaviour, but the second main insight from behavioural 
economics is that the human motivation structure is more complex. There 
are a numerous examples of situations in which people are willing to 
sacrifice their own interests in favour of other people’s welfare (Thaler and 
Mullainathan, 2008). Opposing to the self-interested motivation is the 
generosity people demonstrate when they give money to charities, do each 
other favours or vote for parties supporting policies that go against their 
own interest. It is not straight forward how moral motivation is to be 
identified, because these sorts of actions could also potentially be 
explained by a wish of social status or a hope that the favour will be 
returned, but there is now convincing evidence showing that people care 
about fairness and the welfare of others (Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 
1986).  
In the following there is first a summary of theoretical basics, and 
then implications of the theory for tax compliance are discussed. The first 
part focuses on motivation beyond self-interest, the second part on 
conditional cooperation and why people are morally motivated, while the 
third part is devoted to the potential threat of crowding out intrinsic 
motivation. 
5.1 People are not only self-interested 
The act of complying, even though the risk of getting caught is low, 
tangent a fundamental question of why people would choose to act 
generously when it goes against their own self-interest (Dana et. al., 
2006). If people are not only self-interested, to what degree are they 
influenced by motives that go beyond, and contradict, the objective of 
maximizing own material outcomes as in pure self-interest?  
In the lab, the dictator game is used to identify whether people are 
morally motivated (Dana et al., 2006). It is designed with the purpose of 
measuring the degree of generosity among players and it removes 
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incentives for strategic behaviour. Imagine two players; one dictator and 
one receiver. The dictator is given an amount of money and chooses 
independently how much money to keep and how much to allocate to the 
receiver. The receivers are bounded to accept their offer and it is made 
clear to the dictators that they can allocate the money in whatever way 
they prefer. The game is not repeated which takes away any strategic 
element and both players are anonymous which eliminates the possibility 
of acting generously because of a self-interested motivation like a good 
reputation.  
According to standard economic theory, the dictator will keep the 
money to himself because that is the rational strategy for a player who is 
motivated by self-interest alone. However, studies show that the dictators 
on average give away between 20 and 40 percent of the amount they are 
handed.  When 161 anonymous students at Cornell University (Kahneman 
et al., 1986) participated in the dictator game, 76 % of the participants 
chose to give away 50 % of the money. More often than not, the dictators 
in these experiments allocate money to the receivers, consequently 
reducing their own amount of money. Overall, only about 20 percent of the 
dictators send away the Nash equilibrium, of a game with only selfish 
players, of a zero contribution (Rustichini, 2005). 
Regardless of whether the game is played with large or small 
amounts of money at stake, it generates the same result: People are not 
acting entirely self-interested. They act as if they care about fairness and 
the welfare of others. When players act fairly in dictator games, they show 
a preference for sacrificing self-gains in order to change the distribution of 
material outcomes among others (Rustichini, 2005). There is a high degree 
of consistency across multiple versions of the dictator game in which the 
cost of giving varies (Andreoni and Miller, 2002). If the dictator game 
reflects individual preferences correctly the results demonstrate that 
people have altruistic concerns in addition to self-interested motivation. 
This would imply that the utility function should include factors besides 
own income, e.g. benefits received by others or moral concerns. When the 
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game is played with the possibility of punishing miserly dictators and 
rewarding generous dictator, the results show that people are willing to 
decrease their own pay-off just to punish those who treated them miserly 
(Kahneman et al., 1986). This result has been interpreted as people have a 
taste for fairness.  
The ultimatum game is also designed to identify whether people 
genuinely care about fairness. The design features two people who split a 
specified amount of money through a one-time only, anonymous 
interaction (Camerer, 2003). The proposer makes an offer about how to 
divide the money, the receiver chooses whether to accept or reject this 
proposition. If the receiver rejects the offer, both players end up with 
nothing. If the receiver accepts, they both get the proposed amounts. The 
prediction from standard economic theory is that the receiver accepts any 
offer he gets because no matter how low it is it will still make him better 
off than by rejecting it. For the proposer, the rational behaviour is to offer 
nothing in order to maximize own pay-off. However, what happens in 
these experiments is that the majority of offers are of positive amounts 
and highly unequal proposals are rejected. People turn down offers with 
positive probability, especially if they are low. The explanation for this 
behaviour may be that people simply care about fairness, either in terms 
of the distribution of payoffs or by how the game is played (Rustichini, 
2005). These results are in line with the results from the dictator game 
and show that people often act reciprocal and that they cannot be entirely 
self-interested. 
5.1.1 Implications for tax compliance 
The model of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) has been criticized for 
ignoring nonmonetary factors in the evasion gamble. However, they do 
have a brief discussion of factors besides the loss of income, e.g. social 
stigma, which may affect utility in a situation of detection. The 
nonmonetary factors are represented by the variable s in the utility 
function, which is rewritten as ! ! = 1− !   ! !, !! + !"(!, !!). The new 
	   41	  
variable’s value depends on whether or not evasion is detected by the tax 
authorities. If the taxpayer is detected, reputation may be affected 
negatively and therefore it decreases the pay-off from the gamble. 
However, Allingham and Sandmo (1972) assume the effect of a change in 
nonmonetary factors to be trivial compared to the effect of a change in 
income. Therefore they continue the analysis without the stigma costs, 
based on the model in which the only argument in the taxpayer’s utility 
function is net income.  
 The dictator game demonstrates that people also have moral 
constraints and experiments studying the interaction between people 
indicate that they work as disincentives to evade taxes (Torgler, 2002). 
This implies that other factors should be entered in the utility function. It 
would enrich the analysis of tax compliance to clarify the order and 
ranking of individuals’ preferences rather than to start with the 
assumption that they are already well defined (Torgler, 2002).  
If the motivation to comply is solitary driven by a calculation of 
benefits and costs of getting audited, the taxpayer’s loyalty is best secured 
by high probabilities of detection and severe punishments (Allingham and 
Sandmo, 1972). However, if compliance is based on an evaluation of 
whether evasion is morally justifiable, that should be included in the 
utility function as well. Moral motivation may explain why people pay 
taxes even though the probability of detection and severity of penalties are 
relatively low. In a survey presented in ‘NOU 2009:4’ participants were 
asked to rank different arguments against evasion. The highest-ranking 
argument against involvement in tax evasion was ethics and moral. 
Slemrod (2007) sites a survey by IRS (2006) where American taxpayers 
were asked if they mostly or completely agreed that paying their share of 
taxes is a civic duty. 96 percent of the respondents agreed. However, 62 
percent also said that they paid taxes because they feared an audit. It may 
be difficult to identify the motive that is dominating behaviour, but the 
actual rate of compliance cannot be explained without taking the 
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taxpayer’s responsibilities as citizens into account (Graetz and Wilde, 
1985). 
 People who have moral concerns may have a desire to act consistent 
with their self-image. The tax authorities may benefit from reminding 
people of their moral or honest codes. An experiment in the UK examined 
the impact of changing the location of signatures on tax returns. Simply 
moving the signature box from the end of the return to the beginning 
resulted in more honest information. Compliance also increased when 
moral reminders were used before people filled out their tax forms. 
(Behavioural Insights Team, 2012) The proposed explanation for the 
results is that a shift of focus from just signing the form to paying 
attention to honesty and morality, makes it relatively more difficult to act 
contrary to own beliefs.  
5.2 Conditional cooperation  
Tax compliance is essential for the production of public welfare goods. This 
is also the core of many cooperative relationships. What characterizes 
these relationships is that a group of people, or the overall population, 
harvest the reaping of the group's effort, while costs are carried 
individually. It is therefore for the common good that people choose to 
contribute, even though it might be in each individual’s self-interest to 
avoid contributing. If people act upon their self-interest alone, the results 
would be evident in a drastic decrease of public goods. Experimental 
findings show that people are willing to cooperate with others and punish 
those who do not (Camerer, 2003). These results are relevant to the 
discussion of tax compliance, but before going into their implications, 
there will be a brief introduction to the theoretical basics.  
For the common welfare it is essential to understand how one can 
make people contribute in situations where the society as a whole benefits 
from it. The public goods game identifies cooperation and freeriding 
among individuals (Fishbacher, Gächter and Fehr, 2001). In the game, 
players choose how much money to contribute to a common pool that in 
turn will be multiplied and redistributed equally to all group members. 
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Generally, everyone will be better off if all participators contribute. Yet, 
regardless of what everybody else does, it is in each individual’s self-
interest to contribute nothing. Assume that four individuals are given 
USD 20 and if they contribute a fraction of it, that fraction is multiplied by 
0.4 and redistributed equally to the participants (Fehr and Gächter, 2000). 
In this one-shot game, the participants earn 20 USD if they keep the 
money to themselves and USD 32 if the whole group invest the full 
amount.  As there is no possibility to arrange an agreement with the 
others or cooperate, the rational decision is to contribute nothing. Fehr 
and Gächter (1999) find free riding to be the dominant strategy in the 
game, but there are also people who are willing to contribute some of their 
earnings all of the time. If the game is played repeatedly, the 
contributions always decrease over time. The puzzle is therefore to find 
out how the contributions can be maintained even as time goes by. 
 When punishment is introduced in the public goods game, the 
results change. Fehr and Gächter (1999) provide the participators with a 
possibility of punishing free riders at a cost. They find that the more free-
riders negatively deviate from the group standard, the more people are 
willing to punish them. Even though punishment is costly for the 
punisher, it is this feature that makes it possible to maintain 
contributions stable. In the treatment with no possibility of punishment, 
between 53 and 75 percent people choose to free-ride. With punishment 
the general contribution level maintained at 50 to 95 percent. If the 
participants had the possibility of punishment and could coordinate their 
contributions, the result was close to full cooperation.  This is completely 
contrary to what the standard model of selfish individuals predicts, and 
may have implications for the importance of establishing a social norm. 
The existence of an opportunity for costly punishment causes a large 
increase in cooperation levels because potential free riders face a credible 
threat. It is also evident that free riding causes strong negative emotions 
in the rest of the group. A free rider problem occurs when people ignore 
the consequences of their own actions and rather benefit of the 
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contributions of others. A well-known negative side effect of this problem 
is the tragedy of the commons. When individuals behave strictly self-
interested they end up with damaging a resource that is important for the 
common good.  
5.2.1 Implications for tax compliance 
Cooperation is central to tax compliance. Analysing the game of 
cooperation for public goods is easier done at a small scale; therefore game 
theory is used to formalize the taxpayer’s dilemma. Choosing to comply 
requires individuals to take a personal cost for the benefit of the common 
good. It is not given that people should be willing to cooperate. Evaders 
free ride and depend on other taxpayers to carry the welfare costs. The 
taxpayer’s concerns are two: What they get directly in return for their tax 
payments in form of public goods and services from the government, and 
their subjective perception of fairness.  
As for the first argument, the public goods game shows that some 
people are co-operators that will contribute to the provision of welfare 
goods to the common benefit even though their own private return suffers. 
Taxation and the provision of public goods and services may be seen as a 
contractual relationship between taxpayers and the government 
(Fjeldstad et al., 2012). In a well-functioning tax system there will be sort 
of a quid pro quo, a favour for a favour, implicit agreement between the 
taxpayer and the tax authorities of mutual contributions. The taxpayer 
values the goods and services provided by the government and recognizes 
that the payments are necessary both to help finance the goods and to get 
others to contribute. Consequently, there is an experienced reason for 
paying taxes (Fjeldstad and Semboja, 2001).  
If taxpayers perceive taxes as the price they pay for public goods 
and services, they prefer that there is exchange equity between what they 
pay and what they get in return (Rablen, 2010). In a reference dependent 
model of tax compliance behaviour, taxpayers act sensitive to perceived 
unfavourable inconsistencies between the value of taxes paid and the 
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value of the government services they get in return (Rablen, 2010). 
Compliance may be increased by more effective provision of public goods 
or focusing on the necessity of tax revenue for public goods and services 
(Alm et al., 1992). As it is likely that people do not fully understand the 
direct impact of evasion on public spending, in the UK they are currently 
investigating whether framing tax debts as a loss to a particular public 
service can increase compliance (Behavioural Insights Team, 2012). A 
survey from the Czech Republic (2002) suggests that people are more 
likely to evade taxes if they feel that the provisions from the government 
are insufficient (Slemrod, 2007). However, it is possible that these 
responses reflect a rationalization of evasion. 
Increases in the payoff individuals receive in public goods, increase 
compliance regardless of whether people are free-riders or co-operators 
(Alm et al., 1992). The finding that compliance is positive and stable over 
time even when the probability of detection is zero supports the notion 
that some taxpayers comply because they understand that it is necessary 
in order to maintain the provision public goods. The increase in 
compliance with public goods is non-linear; therefore there are limits to 
how much compliance can be affected by increasing the payoff to 
taxpayers. People are more likely to cooperate if they believe that they will 
benefit from the government’s spending and that their trust in the 
government and other citizens is reciprocated (Levi, 1998). So, a fraction 
of actual compliance can be explained by the taxpayers’ valuation of the 
goods provided by government, and therefore why compliance is higher 
than predicted by the standard model. Cross-country studies show that 
differences in tax compliance behaviour can further be explained by 
differences in social and institutional factors.  
It is assumed that people’s idea of a fair income distribution affects their 
behaviour and therefore tax evasion decisions may depend on perceptions 
of the fairness of the tax system. If both economic and fairness 
considerations affect the compliance decision, it is likely that a person who 
sees the gain from evading still pay taxes if it is hard to justify a non-
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compliant behaviour. A high level of income tax evasion decreases the 
redistributive effect of the progressive income tax. If the general public 
perceive tax evasion to be common acceptable behaviour, it may harm the 
legitimacy of the whole system upon which the welfare state is build. If, on 
the other hand, the distributional effects from taxation are considered 
unfair, that is a common idea of it being ineffective or managed in the 
wrong way, tax evasion may be considered morally justifiable. So the 
acceptance of the redistributive effects and fairness considerations are of 
obvious importance for the outcome of tax policies. From surveys and 
economic experiments it is known that people are willing to sacrifice 
monetary awards in order to avoid large deviations from what they 
consider to be fair (Barth et al., 2012). Experiments have also showed how 
people care about whether or not income inequality is a result of factors 
beyond individual control or not (Cappelen, et al., 2007). If they find that 
their economical situation is due to a tax system that is unfair, and they 
are unable to control this situation, then they might be more willing to 
consider evasion. If people do not feel as if they are taken seriously into 
account, tax moral suffers and, as a consequence, tax compliance (Torgler, 
2002; Frey, 2001). A greater possibility for democratic participation 
increases tax compliance because it supports the intrinsic motivation of 
civic duty (Frey, 2001). Regulations preventing free riding and 
establishing fairness and equity help to preserve tax moral (Torgler, 
2002). 
People’s idea of how they are treated by the tax authorities directly 
affects their motivation for cooperation with them (Frey 2001). Barth et al. 
(2012) refers to the theoretical framework of Bordignon (1993) in which 
taxpayers tend to evade taxes if they have to pay a tax rate that is higher 
than what they believe is a fair price for what they get in return. Some 
people may evade taxes just because they do not agree with the current 
tax strategies (Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein, 1998). Public spending on 
warfare is an example where one might suspect to find different degrees of 
acceptance among taxpayers (Slemrod, 2007). In line with the standard 
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model, Torgler (2002) finds that tax morale increases if public goods are 
provided, but public projects often affect individuals in ways that are 
difficult for the authorities to foresee. Reforms and new projects often 
mean changes, both favourable and unfavourable, in people’s access to 
public goods and therefore also in individual welfare. Society's welfare will 
not only depend on the total quantity of goods and services provided, but 
also on how they are distributed. Projects that are meant to be beneficial 
to society as a whole sometimes stir local controversies.  
By using data from the Norwegian “Hidden Labour Market Survey”, 
Barth et al. (2012) analyse how fairness considerations, in particular of 
just income distribution, affect whether or not people find tax evasion 
justifiable and their willingness to evade taxes. The results are consistent 
with a model where taxpayers make a comparison between economic gains 
and fairness considerations when they make decisions on whether or not 
to report their income. When individuals with the same monthly wages 
are compared, it is found that individuals with low wages and long 
working hours more likely support tax evasion than individuals with high 
wages and shorter working hours (Barth et al., 2012). The individuals 
with low wages and long working hours are also more willing to 
underreport. The proposed explanation for the discrepancy is differences 
in people’s experienced degree of fair treatment by the authorities. The 
group with low wages and long working hours have a stronger belief than 
other groups that they are treated unfairly. If taxes are based on 
principles that can be understood and accepted as fair by as many people 
as possible they may influence law-abiding people who otherwise abstain 
from crime, to avoid tax evasion. In order to reach a level of full 
compliance it is important that people do not perceive the tax system to be 
improper or unfair because it is easier to break a law that seems unfair 
than a law that seems fair (NOU, 2009). 
It is therefore of great importance for the legitimacy of the tax 
system that it is built on trust. The OECD Forum on Tax Administration 
(2010) advices tax authorities to directly respond to information that 
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might be harmful to the reliance in the tax system. If there are 
inaccuracies or public misconceptions in media about the detection rates, 
unfair treatment by the tax administration or exaggerated numbers on 
evasion, it should be corrected with factual evidence to avoid interference 
with social norms and thereby negative impact on compliance rates 
(OECD, 2010). The reduction of tax moral and the increased evasion rates 
in the US have been explained by distrust in public laws (Frey, 2001). The 
feeling of being treated less fairly than others may drive people toward 
evasion, yet social norms and fairness considerations may also increase 
compliance because individuals pay taxes because they relate to 
compliance as a social obligation (Alm et al, 1991). 
Punishment and compensations are tools in the hands of the tax 
authorities. However, social condemnation and support are effective tools 
in the hands of the public. The decision to evade taxes is affected by a sort 
of morally contagious effect (Eide, 2000) and this implies that the 
temptation to evade taxes grows with the proportion of evaders you see or 
hear about. If evasion is common in the taxpayer's social circle, and this is 
widely known, there is reason to believe that guilt and shame associated 
with evasion decreases (NOU, 2009). The perceived gains from evading 
taxes are therefore dependent on how common evasion is. This is partly 
confirmed in a study by Geeroms and Wilmots (1985) that shows how the 
probability of a taxpayer evading taxes increases with degree to which he 
or she believes that others evade taxes. From the UK we know that there 
is a strong social norm against committing acts of fraud and avoiding 
paying debts. People avoid it because they feel a sense of moral obligation 
to contribute. (Behavioural Insights Team, 2012) Taking advantage of 
social norms has been an efficient way to decrease tax evasion and was 
studied in a field experiment in Minnesota. By informing people of the 
actually low rate of tax evasion, taxpayers’ mistaken idea of a high 
number of cheaters were corrected, and it helped to increase voluntary tax 
compliance (Behavioural Insights Team, 2012). A follow-up study in the 
UK shows the same tendency. When a message to 140.000 taxpayers was 
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send out to inform them on the fact that 9 out of 10 people in their area 
had already paid their tax, tax compliance increased with 15 percentage 
points compared to the control group that received a letter with no 
reference to a social norm.  
The reason for the change in behaviour after being provided with 
such information could be that the tax evader avoids the personal cost of a 
negative social stigma when evasion is common, relative to in a country 
where evasion rates are low. The nonmonetary disutility of detected 
evasion might be small if it is perceived that many others evade taxes. If 
the perception of the frequency of evasion increases, the taxpayer might 
decide to evade more because there is less social stigma associated with it 
(Sandmo, 2004). This could in turn trigger more evasion. This mechanism 
relates to the analysis of corruption by Andvig and Moene (1990), where it 
is argued that it is more costly to be an honest person in a country where 
corruption is common. Likewise, it may be acceptable to evade when 
evasion is widespread and more risky to evade in a country characterized 
by a high degree of compliance.  
For tax authorities these findings suggest that it should be of 
importance to establish or stimulate a social norm of evasion being 
unacceptable, but not by giving an idea that it is a frequent habitude. So, 
the way the probability of detection is communicated is of significance to 
how tax policies are perceived by the public (OECD, 2010). It is not 
enough to make it clear that evaders are detected; taxpayers must also be 
assured that honesty is the most usual strategy among them.  This may 
establish a social norm that encourages compliance, which the tax 
authorities can benefit from. Providing people with the information on 
what most people are doing is often effective to stimulate the desired 
behaviour. On the other hand, if the information from the authorities is 
too focused on evasion; it might give the impression that most people are 
evaders and establish an unfavourable norm of non-compliance. If there is 
a strong incentive to free-ride on the private purchases of others, 
Samuelson (1954) claims that the private provision of public goods will 
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remain inadequate. However, if the taxpayers’ decision on whether to free 
ride or not, is contingent on the behaviour they expect from others, full 
voluntary compliance can be a dominant strategy. (Alm et al., 1992) An 
understanding of how own actions can set a leading example for others 
may explain the excess compliance not predicted by the standard theory 
(Alm et al, 1992). 
5.3 Extrinsic vs. intrinsic motivation 
In standard economic theory, where intrinsic motivation is assumed to be 
constant or absent, external intervention will be the only explanatory 
factor for behaviour. Allingham and Sandmo (1972) suggest that 
motivation for compliance is driven by the probability of detection and the 
severity of the punishment, but if we accept the view that moral 
motivation is a supplementary factor for behaviour, it is of interest to take 
a closer look at the interaction between the extrinsic and intrinsic 
motivation. Gneezy and Rustichini (1998) argue that people are 
intrinsically motivated when they perform without an externally given 
reward. There are situations where people are genuinely motivated by, as 
Frey (1997) describes it, their inner obligations, because the activity they 
put an effort in is motivating by itself.  
Gneezy and Rustichini (1998) discuss a set of experiments designed 
to test the effect of monetary incentives on performance. Among other 
studies, they did a case study at a day care centre in Israel. The problem 
they wanted to solve was that parents arrived too late to pick up their 
children and this forced employees to work longer hours. In order to 
change the parent’s behaviour a monetary disincentive in form of a 
penalty fine for arriving late was introduced. The relative price effect 
predicts that levitating monetary incentives increases supply (Frey, 2001). 
As the demanded service in this case was more disciplined parents, one 
would suspect the number of them to increase with the fine because it 
became relatively inexpensive to arrive on time. The actual result of the 
fine however cannot be explained by the standard theory. Instead of 
having more parents coming on time, the number of parents arriving late 
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increased substantially (Gneezy and Rustichini, 1998). It seemed as 
though the parent’s intrinsic motivation to arrive on time was reduced 
when they could pay a price to deviate from the rules.  
The economic approach to human behaviour, based upon the 
relative price effect, is entirely focused on extrinsic motivation. Incentives 
that are not externally given have been completely ignored. Contrary to 
the standard theory, the crowding-out theory by Frey (2001) suggests that 
intervention via monetary incentives or punishments may reduce, rather 
than increase supply because it undermines the intrinsic motivation. In 
certain situations it might therefore be ineffective to use the price 
mechanism to stimulate behaviour (Frey, 2001). If people are intrinsically 
motivated, there is no clear-cut effect of monetary compensation on 
performance, but whenever money is offered, large enough amounts 
always induce higher performances (Gneezy and Rustichini, 1998). 
 External intervention can raise performance because it creates a 
higher marginal cost on cheating (Gneezy and Rustichini, 1998). 
Alternatively, it increases the marginal benefit of not cheating. A 
disciplining effect may come from enforcement, which rewards or 
commands can provide. If external intervention raises intrinsic 
motivation, the behaviour will be as anticipated by the principal because 
the marginal benefit of behaving accordingly is increased. In these 
situations the disciplining effect pulls in the same direction as the 
crowding effect. Hence, the relative price effect corresponds to the 
crowding effect and both external incentives and increased intrinsic 
motivation will raise the motivation to perform. Conversely, if external 
intervention undermines intrinsic motivation, the agent’s marginal benefit 
from performing will be affected negatively and the result will be the 
opposite. Given no disciplining effect, external intervention will 
unambiguously decrease performance. The resulting behaviour will not be 
as anticipated by the agent (Frey, 2001). 
The crowding-out effect can be triggered not only by monetary 
incentives, but also by commands (Frey, 1997).  The effect from rewards 
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and punishments may therefore depend on whether people perceive the 
intervention to be controlling. If they do, intrinsic motivation decreases 
and self-determination and self-esteem are affected negatively.  When 
individuals perceive external intervention to be controlling, that is 
reducing the level of control they have over their own actions, intrinsic 
motivation is replaced by extrinsic control. So the loss of self-
determination transfers control from inside of the person affected, to the 
outside. External interventions may drive people whose default 
preferences are the concerns of others or a group, to more selfish 
preferences and behaviour (Frey 1997). Further, Frey (2012) points out 
that being forced by an external intervention reduces the possibility of 
showing both interest and involvement in other people. As a result of 
impaired self-esteem, intrinsic motivation will suffer and eventually the 
will person act according to external motives alone.  
5.3.1 Implications for tax compliance 
As Torgler (2002) points out, many taxpayers seem to have a more 
complex motivation structure than the one assumed by standard economic 
theory. Standard economic theory assumes intrinsic motivation to be an 
exogenously given constant and sometimes it is even left completely out of 
the theoretical argument (Frey, 2001). This is the case in the model of 
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) where internalised values are taken as 
exogenously given and not influenced by monetary incentives. This type of 
reasoning does not capture the complex motivation structure of taxpayer 
behaviour (Torgler, 2002). Addressing the right source of intrinsic 
motivation for behaviour is complicated. Compared to controlling and 
analysing extrinsic motivators as monetary rewards and penalties, moral 
motivation is a difficult size to measure and hold constant. Therefore, 
although it is problematic, it is also understandable, that the standard 
theory does not differentiate between the different sources of motivation, 
but interpret them as manifestations of underlying preferences for the 
performance or reward associated with it.  
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 Penalties and audits work as incentives for perfectly rational and 
self-interested individuals, but they might be inappropriate when it comes 
to motivate people with high tax moral. Frey (2001) defines tax morale as 
a particular kind of intrinsic motivation and if the goal of tax policies is to 
make it less attractive to evade taxes, the effects from punishments is less 
straightforward than the standard theory assumes. A very small fraction 
of the population actually evades taxes (Kleven et al., 2010), but based on 
the focus tax evasion is given; the problem looks huge. There is thus a risk 
that a marginal problem is given more attention than appropriate. The 
results from focusing too much on monetary incentives to decrease evasion 
might generate the results completely on the contrary of what was 
originally anticipated. This means that stricter policies may crowd out the 
intrinsic motivation for compliance and thus increase evasion. If intrinsic 
motivation is not recognised by the tax authorities, taxpayers may to a 
higher degree accept opportunistic behaviour. If monetary disincentives 
are weak, they may damage intrinsic motivation and work in undesirable 
ways, but as Gneezy and Rustichini (1998) point out, strong enough 
external interventions will always affect behaviour in the anticipated way. 
If penalties for evasion are high enough, people will obey the law. But, the 
observed detection rates and penalties are not sufficiently high to explain 
the actual level of compliance. 
If taxpayers who are intrinsically motivated perceive the policies to 
be directed at dishonest taxpayers only, they do not necessarily have to be 
negatively affected by them (Frey, 1997). Such policies pull morally 
motivated individuals in the same direction as their initial intrinsic 
motivation. Generally when penalties for non-compliance are enforced, 
individuals notice that extrinsic motivation has increased and they comply 
because they are controlled - not because they feel a moral obligation 
(Frey, 1997). The net effect of stricter tax policies is therefore not as clear 
as the model of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) suggests because they may 
end up crowding out civic duty (Frey ,2001).  
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People have a genuine need to show their interest and involvement 
in both other people and the society in which they are a part (Frey, 2001). 
If taxes are paid because it simply feels right these taxpayers may wish to 
be recognized for their behaviour. The enforcement regime reduces the 
opportunity to expose genuine involvement. If taxpayers become less 
intrinsically motivated and shift to behaviour based on extrinsic 
motivation, given low probability detection, they may to a greater extent 
consider the rational alternative of tax evasion. Based on the knowledge 
that extrinsic interference can affect people simply by being controlling or 
demanding, harsher penalties or just a focus on it through media or direct 
communication from the authorities may diminish tax morale. The 
implication for tax policies may be that the parameters used in the AS-
model are not the solitary drivers of tax compliance. The complex 
structure of human behaviour should be considered when implementing 
new policies because stronger enforcement may have unexpected 
consequences for the behaviour of taxpayers. 
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6 Testing theories 
In the exploration of behavioural insights for tax compliance several 
potential explanations for the discrepancy between the predicted levels of 
evasion from the standard model and the observed level have been found. 
The objective in this part of the thesis is to build on these insights and 
study two of the factors in particular through a survey-experiment. In 
specific a treatment analysis is used to study the effect of social norms and 
small changes in the probability of detection on the preferences for hiring 
black labour, which is a common way of evading taxes.  
The next section describes the experimental method; following is a 
presentation of the sample, a description of the design and further the 
procedures of the experiment. Finally the descriptive statistics and results 
are reported and discussed.  
6.1 Identification  
Experimental studies make it possible to extract and isolate effects on 
preferences and attitudes in controlled surroundings. The benefits are 
particularly high degrees of control, the possibility of perfect 
randomisation and therefore precise information and identification of 
causal relationships (Cappelen and Tungodden, 2012). This is important 
because it is often challenging to interpret behavioural data. There may be 
a diversity of possible explanations for the observed behaviour and 
difficulties exist in distinguishing between causality and correlation 
(Cappelen and Tungodden, 2012). Correlation between variables does not 
necessarily mean that a change in one variable causes the changes in 
another. Causation means that one variable causes a change in the other; 
that the cause is the reason for the observation of the effect and 
consequently the cause must always be followed by that effect (Stock and 
Watson, 2007).  
The experimental method ensures that causal relationships are 
identified because it allows for randomization. By allocating people 
randomly in groups, it is possible to look at the effect from manipulating 
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the independent variable, e.g. if a change in the probability of detection, 
causes a change in the dependent variable, that is the probability of 
considering hiring black labour. Thus, in a randomized experiment, 
statistical significant evidence for different outcomes in the treatment 
groups and the control group, implies that the effect is coming from the 
treatment (Stock and Watson, 2007). Potential differences in outcomes 
between the treatment and control groups must then be assigned to the 
treatment and represents the mean causal effect in the population (Stock 
and Watson, 2007), that is the average treatment effect. 
6.1.1. A common challenge 
A challenge with experiments is just the fact that people are under 
observation may lead them to change their behaviour. This is often 
referred to as the Hawthorne-effect (Stock and Watson, 2007; Haynes et 
al., 2012; Cappelen and Tungodden, 2012). The anonymity of the 
questionnaire should reduce this effect, however it cannot be excluded 
that people are affected by the combination of observation and the 
relatively sensitive information they are asked to provide. They might 
answer what they think is the right thing to do, rather than be honest and 
tell what they actually would choose in the situation described to them. 
However, if the answers are biased due to such an experimenter demand 
effect, but not correlated with the treatments, the causality of the study is 
unaffected due to randomization (Stock and Watson, 2007).  
6.2  The sample 
The experiment was conducted online and the participants were recruited 
through Norstat, a leading European collector of survey data. The sample 
consists of 1000 nationally representative Norwegian respondents aged 18 
to 87 years. It is drawn randomly from a pool of 83 000 Norwegians who 
are registered respondents and proportionate with the geographical areas’ 
population, quoted on gender and county of residence. It is confirmed that 
the individuals were recruited to the study before the randomisation of 
treatments was assigned and that anonymity of the respondents was 
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ensured. Because of the randomization it is known that the groups are not 
systematically different with respect to observable or unobservable 
characteristics. 
As these people have agreed to be part of pool of respondents, one 
could argue that there is a risk of selection bias (Haynes et al., 2012; 
Saunders et al., 2009). That is, the people who are part of this experiment 
may systematically differ from the rest of the population. If people 
volunteering for a survey to a higher degree than people in general find it 
useful to do volunteering work, they might have a stronger tendency to be 
morally motivated. If that is the case, then they are not representative for 
the overall population. However, because of the randomization of 
respondents into treatment groups, selection bias does not threat the 
possibility to identify causal effects, even though it raises the question 
about the representativeness of any observed treatment effect. 
6.3  The design 
The experiment was conducted online and the questions posed to the 
participants were based on this structure: “Imagine this situation: You are 
renovation your house. You know that half of the Norwegian population use 
black labour for this sort of work. You also know that it is easy to get hand 
on black labourers who are willing to this sort of work and that it is in 
practice not detected by the tax authorities. How probable is it that you 
would consider using black labour in this situation?” 9. This particular 
question was given to what will be considered as the control group in the 
analysis and their answers are reported on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 
represents “highly improbable that I would consider using black labour” 
and 7 represents “highly probable that I would consider using black 
labour”. 
The responses in the control group allow a study of the effect of a 
zero probability of detection regardless of treatments. Allingham and 
Sandmo (1972) would predict a high willingness to hire black labour in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  See	  appendix	  for	  specifics	  on	  all	  questions.	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this situation because there is no chance that people are detected. 
However, as has been thoroughly discussed in earlier sections, numerous 
studies show that there is a high degree of compliance even when there is 
low or no probability of detection. The present design allows us to 
investigate this issue in more detail. 
To observe effects on the probability that people would consider 
using black labour two different interventions are used. In a similar way, 
the effect of the social norm is inspected. In all, four separate 
manipulations of the question are introduced and descriptions of them 
follow.   
 The first intervention is designed to study whether social norms 
matter to the decision. In the baseline, the respondents are told that half 
of the Norwegian population use black labour. This allows a comparison of 
the effects of manipulating the information in the treatment groups and 
the responses from the control group. In one treatment variation the 
respondents are told that they should think of a situation were most 
people use black labour and decide whether they would consider hiring 
black labour themselves, given that the probability of detection is zero. In 
the other treatment respondents are informed that very few other people 
use black labour in this sort of situation, and they are asked to decide 
whether they would consider hiring black labour themselves given that 
the probability of detection was zero.  
The model of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) predicts that people’s 
preferences are independent of others’ behaviour because the utility 
function does not include any factor representing e.g. social stigma and 
the act of evading is solitary driven by a calculation of own monetary 
reward and risk of detection. As there are no differences in pay-off 
between the groups, the prediction from this model is that a rational 
individual should be unaffected by the treatment variation because their 
only concerns are their final states of wealth.  
However, we have from the earlier discussions on social norms that 
people in fact are affected by the behaviour of others. If they know that 
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many others evade, they are more likely to evade taxes themselves. If they 
think that most others are compliant taxpayers, the social costs of being 
detected for tax evasion is higher, and it is therefore less likely that they 
will choose to evade themselves. Based on these insights, the basic idea of 
the treatments is that informing the participants of the habitude of other 
people when hiring construction workers, will affect their consideration of 
hiring black labour. A priori I expected that people would be affected by 
information on what other people do. The theory of social norms predicts 
that the group informed that most others hire black labour will be more 
willing to consider hiring black labour than the control group where the 
information given is that half of the population use black labour. Further 
it would be suspected that the group informed that very few other people 
use black labour for this type of work would is willing to consider black 
labour than the control group. In short, I expected that the two treatments 
should yield opposite results.  
The second intervention is based on the same structure, but rather 
than manipulating the occurrence of hiring black labour among other 
people, the probability of detection is changed. In order to study whether 
people overweigh small probabilities and if this affect the probability of 
considering black labour, the general use of it was set to half of the 
population in both treatments. In other words the same information on 
occurrence was given to all groups. However, the probability of detection 
was manipulated to 1 of 1000 and to 1 of 100 people in two separate 
treatments. This allows a comparison of outcomes in the treatment groups 
compared to the control group where there is a zero probability of 
detection. 
The standard model predicts that people consider probabilities 
accurately and behave rational with the objective of maximizing own 
expected utility (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972). As people are assumed to 
be risk averse it would be suspected that the willingness to hire black 
labour should decrease with increases in probability of detection and that 
the size of the changes in willingness to consider hiring black labour 
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should correspond to the changes in probabilities of detection. In specific, 
a classic economic prediction is that the reluctance towards hiring black 
labour should be higher in the group where 1 of 100 people is detected 
than in the group where 1 of 1000 is detected. Also, the change from 1 of 
1000 people to 1 of 100 people should be expected to generate a greater 
effect than the change from zero to 1 of 100.  
However, it is known from the earlier discussion of prospect theory 
that people generally overweigh low probabilities and react stronger to 
changes from a state of certainty to uncertainty than in between 
uncertainties. The prediction building on the discussion of overweighting 
low probabilities is that the outcome in the group informed that 1 of 100 
people are detected and the group informed that 1 of 100 people are 
detected, will be merely the same. Accordingly, the theory predicts that 
the change from 1 of 1000 people to 1 of 100 people detected and the 
change from zero to 1 of 100 would generate about the same effect. This is 
because people often have difficulties with differentiating between very 
low probabilities.  
6.4  Procedures 
The questions were set up as a separate module in a survey with different 
topics send out through a web-based omnibus. It was ensured that all 
other questions in the survey were exactly the same, so that the context of 
the question posed did not differ between participants. In practice this 
means that in each survey the respondents received, there was one posed 
from this experiment. Treatments were assigned randomly and in each 
group there were 200 respondents. For each hypothetical situation 
described to the respondent, in other words the different treatments and 
the control treatment, there is a measurable outcome on the scale from 1 
to 7.10 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  There were 48 observations of ‘do not know’, which was reported as 8 on the scale. 
These observations were evenly distributed between the groups and therefore they are 
excluded from the final dataset.	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6.5  Results  
Table 1 gives an overview of the descriptive statistics according to 
treatments. Characteristics are based on self-reported data given by the 
respondents in the survey. The groups are, as expected due to 
randomization, evenly balanced with respect to age and gender. As the 
scale runs from 1 to 7, where 1 represents highly improbable and 7 
represents highly probable, the mean score of 2.75, indicates that 
respondents on average are negative to considering using black labour in 
this situation regardless of treatments. The responses from the 
questionnaire are presented in Figure 1-5. The final dataset is based on 
the answers from 952 of 1000 participants because the 48 observations of 
‘do not know’ are excluded. 
 [	  Table	  1:	  Summary	  Statistics.	  ]	  
 [	  Figure	  1-­‐5:	  Reported	  answers	  in	  all	  treatments.	  ]	  
 
The effects from the treatments are analysed by comparing differences in 
means by regressions including the treatment indicator and variables of 
interest. The differences estimator is the difference in the sample averages 
for the treatment groups and the control group. This is computed by 
regressing the outcome variables for the different treatments on a binary 
treatment indicator.  
 According to the standard theory (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972), 
the treatments should not yield any effects, but this is not what we 
observe. Even though the probability of detection is zero, people are highly 
reluctant towards considering black labour. The mean score in the control 
group, where people were told that half of the population use black labour, 
is 3.05. 30 percent of the respondents in this group reported that it was 
highly improbable that they would consider hiring black labour in this 
situation.  
 The first results presented are from the first intervention where the 
occurrence of using black labour was manipulated. Table 2 reports the 
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results from a regression on scores in the treatment where people were 
told that most others use black labour and the treatment where people 
were told that very few others use black labour in this situation. The 
results are compared to the control group, reported as a constant in the 
regression, where people were told that half of the population use black 
labour in this situation. The efficiency of the differences estimator is 
improved by including control variables of interest in the regression. Table 
2 shows the average treatment effect of introducing a description of what 
other people do in this situation compared to the baseline treatment, when 
controlling for background characteristics of the participants. 
 [	  Table	  2:	  Average	  treatment	  effects	  of	  the	  first	  intervention.	  ]	  
 
The coefficient for the results from the treatment where people were told 
that most others use black labour is negative. The results imply that the 
group receiving this treatment scored – 0.391 (p < 0,05) lower on the scale 
than the control group. The provided information thus decreased the 
respondents’ probability of considering black labour. The coefficient for the 
result of the treatment where people were told that very few others use 
black labour is also negative, – 0.397 (p<0,05). Providing people with this 
information therefore decreased the respondents’ willingness to consider 
hiring black labour.  
It is surprising that these two treatments generated the same 
results and it is difficult to explain why. According to the theory of social 
norms, one would suspect that people who know that very few others use 
black labour are less wiling to consider hiring black labours, which is what 
I found. Yet, when providing people with the exact opposite information, 
that is if most others use black labour, the same negative effect on 
probability of considering black labour is observed, and that is not as 
expected. According to the theory of social norms, it should be more 
probable that people would consider hiring black labour when they know 
that it is a very common thing to do. Remember that the probability of 
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detection is set to zero in all these treatments.  
 Overall, we observe that controlling for background variables has 
little effect on the estimated average treatment effects. Table 2 also 
reports how the probability of considering hiring black labour depends on 
personal characteristics. Observe that the regression reports a strong 
significant, but rather small negative effect of age. The coefficient of – 0,03 
(p<0,001) imply that older people are less willing to use black labour. The 
coefficient of 0.368 (p<0,05) on male indicates that men on average are 
more likely to consider hiring black labour than women. As the 
background variables help to explain the variation on the scale of 
probability of considering black labour, the standard errors are reduced. 
However, the coefficients on the control variables reports just correlation 
and have no causal interpretation. 	   We now turn to a discussion of whether there are heterogeneous 
treatment effects in the sample. Extensive literature shows that males 
and females often respond differently to experimental manipulations 
(Cappelen et al., 2012), therefore an interaction variable of gender and 
treatment is included in the regression. Variation in causal effects that 
depends on observable variables is estimated by including interaction with 
the treatments. As there is a binary indicator representing gender, the 
distinct causal effects for men and women can be estimated by including 
interaction variables in the regression. The dummy variable representing 
gender is therefore multiplied with the treatment where people were told 
that most others use black labour, and the same goes for the interaction 
variable where the variable representing gender is multiplied with the 
treatment where people were told that very few others use black labour. 
The interaction of age and treatments is inspected in the same manner 
and the results are reported in Table 3. 	  
 
[ Table 3: Heterogenous treatment effects of the first intervention. ]  
 
From the regression it is observed a significant negative effect of the 
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treatment where people were told that very few other people use black 
labour. The distinct effect on men can be found by adding the coefficient 
on male and the coefficient on the interaction variable with the treatment 
effect. This is the only significant result from the regression with 
interaction variables on background characteristics. The total effect for 
men is – 0,0955 implying that the treatment where people were informed 
that very few other people hire black labour made men less willing to 
consider hiring black labour. This is as expected. However, the treatment 
effect on women of telling them that most others use black labour is 
0,0825. The probability of women considering hiring black labour 
increases when they are told that very few others use black labour. Thus, 
they become more positive towards hiring black labour when they know 
that very few other people do this, indicating that the responses from 
women are causing the confusing results. 
We now turn to a discussion of the treatment effects of the second 
intervention. Remember that in these treatments the probability of 
detection has been manipulated and they are compared to the control 
group, where the probability of detection is zero. In one treatment it is 
stated that 1 of 1000 people are detected if they use black labour and in 
the other people are informed that 1 of 100 people are detected. Table 4 
reports a regression with the results.  
 
[Table 4: Average treatment effects of the second intervention. ] 
 
The results indicate negative effects of both the treatment in which people 
are told that 1 of 1000 are detected for using black labour ( – 0,342, p < 
0,10) and the treatment where they are told that 1 of 100 people are 
detected for using black labour (– 0,332, p < 0,10). These results imply 
that the two treatments have the same effect on the respondents when 
compared to the results from the control group. This is in line with the 
predictions from prospect theory and the result will be further discussed. 
Table 5 also reports the effects of the treatments when controlling 
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for the background variables age and gender and the regression reports 
the same tendencies as discussed for the first intervention: Men are more 
likely to consider hiring black labour than women are and older people are 
less likely to consider hiring black labour. These are correlations between 
the variables and they cannot be interpreted as causal effects.  
When controlling for interaction between background variables and 
the treatments in the second intervention, there are not found any 
significant effects, see Table 5. 
 
[Table 5: Heterogeneous treatment effects of the second intervention] 
6.6  Discussion of the treatment effects 
We will start by discussing the results of the intervention trying to 
manipulate a social norm before we move on to discuss the effects of 
changes in the probability of detection.  
Informing participants that very few people use black labour 
decreased their willingness to consider hiring black labour. This 
corresponds to existing research on social norms and suggests that the 
decision to engage in an evading activity is affected by factors beyond the 
standard theory of purely self-interested motivation. Even though the 
probability of detection was zero, most people did not want to consider 
black labour for renovation work, and when they knew that most people 
did not hire this type of construction workers they were even more 
reluctant towards it.  
However, the results of this intervention are confusing because of 
the effect of the treatment where participants were told that most others 
use black labour. When provided with this information, the probability 
that people would consider it also decreased. It seems as if the responses 
from women cause this result and it is not in line with existing research 
on social norms. It has been argued that social norms have an effect on 
individual behaviour so it is difficult to explain how the treatment stating 
a social norm against black labour and a treatment with the exact 
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opposite statement should generate the same results. One possible 
explanation for this result could be if people are affected by their belief in 
the efficiency of the tax system. If they are told that most other people use 
black labour, they might find it more important that they use legal firms, 
as it is beneficial for society as a whole. This is in line with efficiency 
arguments for moral motivation. However, this explanation has not been 
tested and is just an informal attempt of an explanation for the surprising 
treatment effect.  
We now consider the results of the second intervention. According 
to the standard model of evasion (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972), the 
strategy for a risk-neutral individual is to underreport income whenever 
the probability of detection is as low as in this experiment (Alm et al., 
1991) However, the results show that even when the probability of 
detection is zero, people are highly reluctant towards hiring black labour. 
The results from the treatments where the probabilities of detection were 
manipulated are in line with the prediction from prospect theory and the 
phenomenon of overweighting low probabilities. Telling people that 1 of 
100 is detected for using black labour and that 1 of 1000 people is detected 
for it, have the exact same effect on the probability of considering hiring 
black labour. It is generally found that people overweigh small 
probabilities in situations of risk. When comparing the outcomes from the 
two treatments, we observe this tendency. The effect of the small change 
in probabilities on the willingness to consider hiring black labour, when it 
is compared to the base group where it is certain that people will not be 
detected by the tax authorities, confirms that people have difficulties 
when evaluating low probabilities. The participants overweigh the small 
changes in probabilities and behave exactly as predicted by prospect 
theory. They are unable to differentiate between the situation that may 
happen with a 0.01 percent probability, and the situation that may 
happen with a 0.001 percent probability, even though the first situation is 
ten times as likely to occur. People systematically behave like the 
probability of detection is the same in the two situations.  
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This pattern could explain why people are law-abiding even when 
the rational decision would be to break the law. The result contradicts the 
prediction from standard economic theory. If people give more weight to 
the probability of an audit than they ought to relative to an expected 
utility model, then compliance will be greater than the level suggested by 
expected utility theory (Alm et al., 1991).  
7  Conclusion 
Through the exploration of behavioural insights for tax compliance it is 
found that there are several potential explanations for the discrepancy 
between the observed level of compliance and the level predicted by the 
theoretical model of tax evasion by Allingham and Sandmo (1972).  
First, people do not perceive the evasion gamble as it is set, but as 
they construe it.  Because of loss aversion, there is an experienced 
difference between having paid too much in preliminary taxes and having 
refunds due. People who owe taxes may therefore more likely consider 
evading taxes. The overweighting of low probabilities makes it difficult for 
people to grasp how likely it is that they are detected for evasion. This 
may explain some of the excess compliance observed. The tendency is 
observed in the results from the conducted experiment on willingness to 
consider black labour. The highest level of evasion is found among self-
employed. This may be explained by procrastination, as failed planning for 
taxes put this group in an unfavourable situation that might lead them to 
consider evasion.  
Secondly, people are not only motivated by their self-interest. Moral 
motivation and preferences for fairness may explain why some people 
choose to comply even though the rational choice would be evasion. Tax 
morale is a favourable trait to the tax system because it increases 
compliance, but intrinsic motivation can be crowded out by a strong focus 
on the penalties for tax evasion.  
Ignoring the implications of behavioural economics for tax policy 
may lead to both mistaken policies and missed opportunities. 
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9 Appendix  
9.1 Results 	  
Table 1: Summary statistics 
 Mean Std. Dev. 
Age 49.5997 15.7529 
Male 0.49894 0.50026 
Treatment 1 2.60938 1.97855 
Treatment 2 3.05236 1.92965 
Treatment 3 2.68817 1.84818 
Treatment 4 2.6875 1.94862 
Treatment 5 2.73298 1.94853 
Observations 952  
 
Note: “Age” (in years) and “Male” (an indicator variable taking the value 1 
if the participant is a male) are self-reported by the participants in the 
experiment. “Treatment 1” is the treatment where participants are told 
that most others use black labour, “Treatment 2” (control group) is where 
they are told that half of the population use black labour and “Treatment 
3” is where they are told that very few others use black labour. In these 
three treatments people are informed that the probability of detection is 
zero. In “Treatment 4” and “Treatment 5” the occurrence of using black 
labour is set to half of the population and the probability of detection is 
changed to 1 of 1000 and 1 of 100 people, respectively. The answers were 
reported on a scale that runs from 1 to 7, where 1 represents highly 
improbable and 7 represents highly probable. 
	   76	  
 
Figure 2: Results from the questionnaire “Most people use black labour” 
 
Note: The graph report the answers from the questionnaire given in 
“Treatment 1”, where participants were informed that most others use 
black labour and the probability of detection is zero. On the scale, 1 
represents “highly improbable that I would consider hiring black labour” 
and 7 represents “highly probable that I would consider hiring black 
labour”. 
 
Figure 3: Results from the questionnaire "Half the population use black labour" 
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Note: The graph reports the answers from the questionnaire given in 
“Treatment 2” (control group), where participants were told that half of 
the population use black labour and the probability of detection is zero. On 
the scale, 1 represents “highly improbable that I would consider hiring 
black labour” and 7 represents “highly probable that I would consider 
hiring black labour”. 
 
Figure 4: Results from the questionnaire "Very few people use black labour" 
 
Note: The graph reports the answers from the questionnaire given in 
“Treatment 3”, where participants were told that very few people use 
black labour and the probability of detection is zero. On the scale, 1 
represents “highly improbable that I would consider hiring black labour” 
and 7 represents “highly probable that I would consider hiring black 
labour”. 
 
38.17
20.97
8.065
15.59
6.452 5.376 5.376
0
10
20
30
40
50
P
er
ce
nt
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Treatment 3
	   78	  
Figure 5: Results from the questionnaire "1 of 1000 people is detected" 
 
Note: The graph reports the answers from the questionnaire given in 
“Treatment 4”, where participants were told that half of the population 
use black labour and that the tax authorities detect 1 of 1000 people. On 
the scale, 1 represents “highly improbable that I would consider hiring 
black labour” and 7 represents “highly probable that I would consider 
hiring black labour”. 
 
Figure 6: Results from the questionnaire "1 of 100 people is detected" 
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Note: The graph reports the answers from the questionnaire given in 
“Treatment 5”, where participants were told that half of the population 
use black labour and the tax authorities detect that 1 of 100 people. On 
the scale, 1 represents “highly improbable that I would consider hiring 
black labour” and 7 represents “highly probable that I would consider 
hiring black labour”. 
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Table 2: Average treatments effects of the first intervention on probability of 
considering hiring black labour (relative to control group) 
 (1) 
 Subjective 
Treatment 1 -0.391* 
 (0.191) 
  
Treatment 3 -0.397* 
 (0.190) 
  
Age -0.0313*** 
 (0.00509) 
  
Male 0.368* 
 (0.155) 
  
_cons 4.411*** 
 (0.302) 
N 569 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Note: The table reports average treatments effects on the probability of 
considering hiring black labour, where the dependent variable is reported 
on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 represents highly improbable that you 
would consider hiring black labour and 7 represents highly probable that 
you would consider hiring black labour. “Treatment 1” is the treatment 
where people were told that most others use black labour, “Treatment 3” is 
the treatment where people were told that very few others use black 
labour. These are reported relative to the control group, where people 
were told that half of the population use black labour, which is reported in 
the regression as a constant. “Age” (in years) and “Male” (an indicator 
variable taking the value 1 if the participant is a male) are self-reported 
by the respondents.  
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Table 3: Heterogenous treatment effects of the first intervention on probability of 
considering hiring black labour. 
 (1) 
 Subjective 
Treatment 1 0.303 
 (0.752) 
  
Treatment 3 -0.516 
 (0.639) 
  
T1_male -0.412 
 (0.380) 
  
T3_male -0.939* 
 (0.377) 
  
T1_age -0.00959 
 (0.0132) 
  
T3_age 0.0119 
 (0.0114) 
  
Male 0.803** 
 (0.266) 
  
Age -0.0323*** 
 (0.00809) 
  
_cons 4.246*** 
 (0.450) 
N 569 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Note: The table reports logit marginal effects of the first intervention on 
the reported probability of considering hiring black labour. “Treatment 1” 
is the treatment where participants are told that most others use black 
labour, “Treatment 3” is the treatment in which participants are told that 
very few others use black labour, and these are reported relative to the 
control group, reported as a constant in the regression, where people were 
told that half of the population use black labour. “T1_male” and “T3_male” 
are the interactions of “Treatment 1” and “Treatment 3” with “Male”, 
respectively. “Male” is an indicator variable taking the value 0 if the 
participant is female and the value 1 if the participant is male. The 
interactions of “Treatment 1” and “Treatment 3” with “Age” (in years) are 
reported with the variables “T1_age” and “T3_age”, respectively. The 
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answers from the respondents are reported on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 
represents “highly improbable that I would consider hiring black labour” 
and 7 represents “highly probable that I would consider hiring black 
labour”. 
 
 
Table 4: Average treatment effects of the second intervention on the probability 
of considering hiring black labour (relative to the control group) 
 (1) 
 Subjective 
Treatment 4 -0.342+ 
 (0.189) 
  
Treatment 5 -0.332+ 
 (0.190) 
  
Age -0.0311*** 
 (0.00476) 
  
Male 0.660*** 
 (0.155) 
  
_cons 4.260*** 
 (0.282) 
N 574 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Note: The table reports average treatments effects on the probability of 
considering hiring black labour, where the dependent variable is reported 
on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 represents highly improbable that you 
would consider hiring black labour and 7 represents highly probable that 
you would consider hiring black labour. “Treatment 4” is the treatment 
where people were told that 1 of 1000 people is detected for using black 
labour, “Treatment 5” is the treatment where people were told that 1 of 
100 people is detected for using black labour. These are reported relative 
to the control group, where people were told that there is a zero 
probability of detection. “Age” (in years) and “Male” (an indicator variable 
taking the value 1 if the participant is a male) are self-reported by the 
respondents.  
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Table 5: Heterogenous treatment effects of the second intervention on the 
probability of considering hiring black labour 
 (1) 
 Subjective 
Treatment 4 -0.329 
 (0.639) 
  
Treatment 5 -0.284 
 (0.630) 
  
T4_male -0.0990 
 (0.380) 
  
T5_male -0.333 
 (0.381) 
  
T4_age 0.000752 
 (0.0118) 
  
T5_age 0.00256 
 (0.0114) 
  
Male 0.803** 
 (0.266) 
  
Age -0.0323*** 
 (0.00809) 
  
_cons 4.246*** 
 (0.450) 
N 574 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Note: The table reports logit marginal effects of the second intervention on 
the reported probability of considering hiring black labour. “Treatment 4” 
is the treatment where participants are told that 1 of 1000 people is 
detected for the use of black labour, “Treatment 5” is the treatment in 
which participants are told that 1 of 100 people is detected for the use of 
black labour, and these are reported relative to the control group, reported 
as a constant in the regression, where people are told that the probability 
of detection is zero. “T4_male” and “T5_male” are the interactions of 
“Treatment 4” and “Treatment 5” with “Male”, respectively. “Male” is an 
indicator variable taking the value 0 if the participant is female and the 
value 1 if the participant is male. The interactions of “Treatment 4” and 
“Treatment 5” with “Age” (in years) are reported with the variables 
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“T4_age” and “T5_age”, respectively. The answers from the respondents 
are reported on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 represents “highly improbable 
that I would consider hiring black labour” and 7 represents “highly 
probable that I would consider hiring black labour”. 
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9.2  Questions posed to the participants in the experiment 
 
Treatment 1 
Imagine the following situation. You are renovating your house. You know 
that most other people use black labour for this sort of work. You also 
know that it is easy to get hold of black labourers and that this type of 
work is not detected by the tax authorities.  
How probable is it that you would consider using black labour in this 
situation? 
 
Treatment 2 
Imagine the following situation. You are renovating your house. You know 
that half of the population use black labour for this sort of work. You also 
know that it is easy to get hold of black labourers and that this type of 
work is not detected by the tax authorities.  
 
How probable is it that you would consider using black labour in this 
situation? 
 
Treatment 3 
Imagine the following situation. You are renovating your house. You know 
that very few other people use black labour for this sort of work. You also 
know that it is easy to get hold of black labourers and that this type of 
work is not detected by the tax authorities.  
 
How probable is it that you would consider using black labour in this 
situation? 
 
Treatment 4 
Imagine the following situation. You are renovating your house. You know 
that half of the population use black labour for this sort of work. You also 
know that it is easy to get hold of black labourers and for this type of work 
	   86	  
the tax authorities detect 1 of 1000 people.  
 
How probable is it that you would consider using black labour in this 
situation? 
 
Treatment 5 
Imagine the following situation. You are renovating your house. You know 
that half of the population use black labour for this sort of work. You also 
know that it is easy to get hold of black labourers and for this type of work 
the tax authorities detect 1 of 100 people.  
 
How probable is it that you would consider using black labour in this 
situation? 
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